Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-032 *16 February 1995*

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Berisha Supports French Initiative on FRY

AU1502144295 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 12 Feb 95

[Statement by Albanian President Sali Berisha; place and date not given—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] As regards the proposal put forward by the French Government and supported by the European Union [EU] regarding a new high-level conference to resolve the conflict and problems in the former Yugoslavia, President of the Republic of Albania Sali Berisha has declared:

I support the new French proposal on a conference on the former Yugoslavia. I think that by complying with current plans and by making a new and general approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, this conference would constitute an important stimulus to the peace process in our region. In order to ensure a constant and long-term peace, the conference should by all means put the Kosova issue on its agenda and invite Kosova's legitimate representatives to attend the conference.

The effort to resolve the Kosova issue is perhaps the best service the international community can do the current and future stability of our Balkan peninsula.

Minister Makes Slovene Stopover on Russian Trip

AU1502150095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 12 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian Interior Minister Agron Musaraj left today for an official visit to the Russian Federation. During this visit, Musaraj will hold talks with his Russian counterpart and sign several joint agreements on fighting crime.

On his way to Moscow, Musaraj stopped over in Ljubljana. During his stay at the Slovene capital, he was received, in a working visit, by Slovene Interior Minister Andrej Ster.

The two ministers discussed a cooperation agreement between their ministries that was signed a year ago. They concluded that the agreement had been generally accomplished.

They reiterated the desire and need to further boost relations between the police of the two countries.

Mr. Musaraj also met with representatives of the Albanian community in Slovenia.

Serreqi Favors Dialogue, Friendliness With Greece

AU1502122995 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 14 Feb 95

[Report by Gezim Qinami]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] At its meeting today, the Foreign Policy Commission of the People's Assembly summoned Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi in connection with Albania's relations with neighboring countries and the development of Balkan cooperation in general.

The commission judged that our foreign policy priorities in the Balkans should be permanent and take precedence as regards the problems the region faces and the latest developments there. In this framework, the commission stressed the need to increase the efficiency of the work of our representational offices in regional countries.

Answering a question on relations with the Republic of Greece, Mr. Serreqi declared that we favor dialogue and believe in the goodwill of both countries for good-neighborliness. Albania has been and is ready for dialogue with Greece. We believe in positive developments in relations between the two countries. [passage omitted]

PD, Greek Party To Strengthen Relations

AU1502104895 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Within the framework of political party meetings and at the invitation of the Democratic Party (PD), a meeting was held at PD headquarters today between PD and Human Rights Union Party (PBDNj) [Greek minority party] representatives.

The meeting was attended by PD Secretary General Tritan Shehu and PD Deputy Chairman Tomorr Dosti; the PBDNj was represented by a delegation led by PBDNj Chairman Vasil Melo.

Talks focused on real possibilities for cooperation between the two parties regarding those points in the program that address the solution of problems currently of concern to our society, and on which opinions converge.

Dialogue between the parties was seen as the most democratic and constructive road to better knowing and understanding each other, characterized always by a spirit of tolerance, understanding, and the preservation of identity. This is the axis around which these parties' programs revolve.

The two sides assessed the traditional coexistence between Albanians and the Greek minority community and expressed themselves in favor of preserving and further strengthening the fraternal, friendly spirit that characterizes relations between them.

Both sides expressed the conviction that the continuation of bilateral dialogue or more with those political forces considered necessary by the parties, is a current necessity and serves to consolidate democracy in Albania and embark upon a course of dignified integration into the European family.

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Selami 'Optimistic' About Approval of Constitution

AU1602093795 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 14 Feb 95

[Report by Amalia Dhamo]

[FBIS Translated Text] Answering reporters' questions at today's news conference, Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Eduard Selami declared that he remains loyal to the opinion of the PD National Council that Albania should have its own constitution as soon as possible.

Selami further detailed the reasons for a new option of approving the draft constitution in parliament. According to Selami, as there is no support from any political force inside or outside parliament, there is no reason to prevent the parliament from discussing the draft constitution. Selami said: Because even the PD is not, in principle, against the parliament's ratifying the draft constitution, after the referendum, I proposed that the draft constitution should be discussed in parliament, Selami said. However—he said, at yesterday's meeting of the PD Presidency—Berisha and the majority of its members did not agree with my idea. That is why—Selami said—he will put forward this proposal at the PD National Council, as the supreme body.

Another reason why Selami defends the idea of the draft constitution's being adopted by parliament is the recommendation by the Council of Europe. Regarding this, Selami said: The suggestions I have received regarding the approval of the draft constitution in Albania have been that the Council of Europe does not see any political reason to avoid the parliament.

As regards Europe's attitude, Selami said the constitution is a request but not a condition for Albania's admittance to Europe.

In any case, Selami expresses himself with optimism after his last visit to Strasbourg. Selami was also optimistic about the approval of the constitution in the parliament, doubting only the vote of socialists because, as he said, we have many things in common with other parliamentary parties. In this respect, the constitution should unite Albanians.

Selami declared that there will be no divisions in the party. We, as the PD—Selami said—will go together not only in the Assembly, but also in elections. In the framework of democracy, we should be accustomed to different opinions within the party, Selami underlined.

Selami favored the opinion that the negotiating table of political parties to draft the constitution should be expanded. He then supported President Berisha's statement that the question of Kosova be discussed in the new French initiative as an issue that serves peace in the region.

Regarding relations with Greece, Selami said that it is in the interest of both countries that relations between two most ancient neighbors be good, as this will benefit not only them, but beyond.

Regarding Macedonia [The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], he said that the Government of Macedonia should make every effort to ensure the rights of Albanians in Macedonia.

At the news conference, Selami declared that he remains loyal to his idea of merging the post of party chairman with that of prime minister like the Western model. I have not considered names regarding this, Selami said, but I think this serves the national interest.

Selami considered the right to be the PD's natural ally despite his critical stance toward the manner of governing. He considers that the PD favors cooperation in principle, but that the way the right implemented its policy would determine the relations of the party in power with them.

Selami said that party interests should not blind us into neglecting the national interest.

Berisha Strips Former Communists of 'Honor Titles'

AU1502100195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 13 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Based on proposals put forward by many national organizations and associations, and on his constitutional prerogatives, the president of the Republic of Albania, Sali Berisha, has decreed the removal of all decorations and honor titles from persons of the former Communist high nomenklatura, such as Enver Hoxha, Nexhmije Hoxha, Shefqet Peci, Hysni Kapo, Gogo Nushi, Spiro Koleka, Haki Toska, and Haxhi Lleshi, considering the criminal act of genocide they perpetrated against the Albanian people during the years of the Communist dictatorship.

Other persons from this nomenclature were deprived of their honor titles and decorations by means of judicial decisions.

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Zhelev on Relations With BSP, U.S. Visit

AU1502145295 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 10 Feb 95 p 9

[Interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Tosho Toshev; place and date not given: "I Am Going to the United States Not To Represent the BSP Government but To Work With This Government for Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Toshev] Mr. President, you are heading for the United States for the first time in the company of socialist ministers and under the pressure of a socialist government behind your back. Does this mean that you see yourself as the president of a less democratic state than in the past?

[Zhelev] This is a difficult question.... I visited Washington as head of state already in 1990. Afterwards, I made several working visits. The current visit is an official and working visit, and it will end with the signing of some important documents that will regulate bilateral relations between Bulgaria and the United States.

I do not elect our country's governments. This is a democracy. Despite the fact that this is an official visit by a head of state, documents will be signed and talks conducted that may lead to certain commitments. Therefore I must take the relevant ministers with me regardless of what kind of cabinet they belong to.

Both the president and the government lead the same state, and their relations have been specifically regulated. Each has prerogatives as prescribed by the Constitution. If we want to be a democratic and rule-of-law state, we must observe those relations precisely as they have been set down in the Constitution. The question is: What does Bulgaria need and what is beneficial to the country? Both the government and I are obliged to work for the country.

[Toshev] Do you expect Prime Minister Videnov to come to the airport on Sunday to see you off? Is it obligatory according to state protocol?

[Zhelev] According to state protocol this is normal, despite the fact that at present we do not actually have a uniform state protocol. Simply, this is a matter of political ethics in relations between the state's basic institutions. When a head of state departs it is natural for government representatives to see him off. After all, he does not go abroad for pleasure but in order to conduct state affairs.

[Toshev] If during the talks with President Clinton you were to have to explain "the silent steps of the pink velvet revolution in our country," would you explain it mainly through the processes in East Europe and its turn to the left, or as a philosopher, would you seek Bulgarian arguments?

[Zhelev] The usual term is a velvet, or tender, restoration—as Adam Michnik put it. I do not know how much this applies to our reality, because after all, this government has been in office only 20 days and I do not think it is ethical to issue categorical and committing assessments until the government completes 100 days in office. During this time, the government will show what it can or cannot do, and what its basic orientation in foreign and domestic policy will be. I said that, in principle, I have cooperated and will cooperate, with all governments as long as they work for reform, democratization, and integration into Europe as well as European and Atlantic structures, because I think that we have no other alternative. As it stands now, governments have stopped working for Bulgaria. I did not hesitate to withdraw my support and declared myself against the cabinet.

[Toshev] Five years have passed since 10 November 1989, and it becomes more and more clear that Washington cannot replace Moscow. What do you expect from the important visit to the United States that begins in two days?

[Zhelev] First of all I would like to say that the dilemma between Washington or Moscow is baseless, despite the fact that it has been frequently referred to in the past, as if we want to replace one big brother with another across the ocean. I think that the reality is different; and this is fortunate, because now small and medium-sized European states such as Bulgaria have the opportunity to work for a greater community to which the United States, too, belongs. One way or another, I hope that Russia will one day commit itself and join those European and Atlantic structures that encompass the economic, security, and political cooperation issues of this entire community. If this does not materialize one day, our world will never be stable. However, I would like to view different aspects of my visit to United States.

We are going to the most powerful nation in the world, from an economic and military point of view. It is very important for our nation to have good bilateral relations with the United States, in addition to multilateral cooperation within NATO's Partnership for Peace program—because Washington could really help us in certain areas. I mean the financial area—U.S. influence in the IMF, the World Bank, G-24—and bilateral military cooperation. Bulgaria has already signed several agreements on military-technical cooperation and the training of our cadres in the United States. Other kinds of military cooperation are being implemented on a reciprocal basis, and this is important for us. It is not enough to say that Bulgaria's security is a matter of primary importance for the United States, as one of their noted statesmen said in the past. This statement must be supported by more specific measures.

[Toshev] Do you intend to bring up the issue of Bulgaria's losses caused by the Yugo-embargo and the sanctions against Iraq? If a positive result is achieved through your talks, would you be embarrassed by anything related to the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]

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and its voters, who elected you three years ago? After all, they could say that you are helping the "Red" government.

[Zhelev] In principle I reject such logic. Let me repeat that I am prepared to work with every government that protects Bulgaria's national interests. I am not going to the United States in order to represent the new BSP government and its ministers, but in order to do something beneficial for our country, and I hope that the three BSP ministers who are coming with me will exhibit a constructive approach. As far as the SDS and my voters who belong to that political force are concerned, I think they are sufficiently mature not to succumb to such logic and place purely party interests and bias above the great interests of Bulgaria.

[Toshev] A more specific question. Will you be discussing ways and means of attracting U.S. capital to investments in Bulgaria?

In my program there are several meetings with the secretary of trade, representatives of the World Bank, their Chamber of Trade, and so on. In New York we will have meetings with representatives of business circles and major companies and groups with whom we will have appropriate talks. I hope very much to be able to explain what Bulgaria could offer eventual U.S. investors, because they will not invest in Bulgaria out of idealistic considerations. They will come if it pays off. Profit dictates everything. In order to attract investors it is very important to explain what our legislation offers. We must also explain the extent of our reforms and the general situation in the country, and its stability. All those issues are very important and require constant clarification. We are doing very little in order to propagate what Bulgaria could offer.

[Toshev] Mr. President, if I am not mistaken this is your fifth visit to the United States in the last four years. You have not visited Russia since October 1991. How do you intend to balance the two superpowers?

[Zhelev] I really have not visited Russia since 1991, because Yeltsin came to Bulgaria to sign the bilateral treaty. All the other cooperation documents that clarify the treaty have been worked out and signed at the level of the executive branch. This has to do with settling our mutual debts, military supplies, and other issues that are important to our Army. It also applies to our trade relations. All this depended on the executive branch, and it dealt with those matters.

During this period, President Yeltsin and I also met at least three or four times at various international forums. We also have a red telephone line. As you know, I have been invited to Moscow and will visit there on 9 May.

[Toshev] As regards foreign policy, I would like to ask you whether you expect any problems with Mr. Videnov's cabinet? Do you foresee a clash between institutions? In other words, is another Boyana meadows possible? [reference to the Zhelev news conference that prompted the fall of Filip Dimitrov's cabinet. It took place in August of 1992 at Boyana meadows]

[Zhelev] These situations do not repeat or resemble each other.

Naturally however, if great contradictions with the current majority and Mr. Videnov's cabinet emerge, if it comes to serious differences in fundamental and principled issues of foreign policy, national security, and even domestic policy—I especially mean reforms—this would be inevitable. However, I do not think our country needs a confrontation. It is too tired from past confrontations. What the country needs is more specific cooperation between institutions on the basis of the Constitution and within the framework of their prerogatives. This is an absolute prerequisite of such cooperation. Of course the Constitution cannot guarantee that there will be no contradictions and clashes; but as far as our institution is concerned, we will not provoke a confrontation for the sake of a confrontation. I do not think there is another Bulgarian politician who understands better than I what a confrontation between institutions means.

[Toshev] I have three questions that are not related directly to the theme of this interview, but I would like to ask them nonetheless.

In his presidential campaign three years ago, Academician Blagovest Sendov [National Assembly chairman], one of your opponents in the presidential elections, said that when he was expelled from the Komsomol in 1956, you were a member of the University Komsomol leadership. Did the subject arise during your first meeting after he was elected National Assembly chairman?

[Zhelev] No, we did not talk about this. Our conversation took a completely different course: mutual relations between the state institutions and the danger of confrontation, already in the beginning. However, the issue you are bringing up is interesting, because at the time I did not have the opportunity to fully clarify it.

Academician Sendov's accusation is completely groundless, because I have never been a member of the university or faculty Komsomol leadership. I was in charge of sports and physical culture at the Komsomol bureau. Furthermore, it was my class that organized the first political rebellion at the university after 9 September 1944. We issued an ultimatum to the Office of the Dean—I mean myself, Petur Mitev, Asen Ignatov, Merdzhanov, and Asen Kartalov—and demanded the elimination of all Stalinist methods of teaching. We declared ourselves against Red professors such as Raycho Karakolov, Yanko Atanasov, and Radoslav Yanchev, who were far removed from science. The protest was very shrill, and it confused and surprised the faculty leadership....

I do not want to go into details, I recall the event only to show Mr. Sendov that at a time that he was a victim, we had the courage to rebel against the system.

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[Toshev] Two days ago Minister Ilcho Dimitrov announced a decision on obligatory rallies on 24 May [Day of Bulgarian Culture and Slavonic Letters], at which you and the prime minister will wave from the rostrum. Do you see yourself as someone who would wave from the rostrum?

[Zhelev] I think it is obligatory...not to do something like this. This is too close for comfort to certain memories. I do not mean 24 May, which is a venerable holiday, but the 9 September and 1 May rallies. Obviously, some time must pass before the people forget those things and erase the associations from their awareness. I also do not think that the universities and high schools should be told how to celebrate. There are many fine ways in which to do so, but they should not be subject to rigid rules.

[Toshev] Nevertheless, you did not answer: Do you see yourself waving from the rostrum?

[Zhelev] (laughing) Not me.

[Toshev] Last question: You said recently that if you get angry you will again run for president in two years' time. Could you specify who and what could make you so angry as to prompt this step?

[Zhelev] Various people and various things.

[Toshev] Mr. President, thank you for your time, and good luck in the United States!

Videnov Outlines Cabinet Plans, Philosophy

AU1502164995 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 13 Feb 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov on 12 February; place not given: "Videnov: People's Faith Is Our Strongest Trump Card"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Left has always kept its promises. We have never deceived the people. Therefore, they trust us, rely on us, and support us. The people's faith is our strongest trump card, and it would be insane to waste it, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov said on 12 February in an interview for DUMA. This is what he said in detail.

[DUMA] The cabinet began its activity by increasing prices rather than decreasing them, as the propaganda of your political opponents tried to lead the voters to expect. Will the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] be able to "cash in" its political promises? What can be expected in the first 100 days?

[Videnov] I worked personally on the BSP program, the Democratic Left's election platform, and the cabinet's program declaration. I can state in the most responsible manner that there is no contradiction between those three documents, and I am sure that our actions, based on the program of governing and the legislative program, will clearly prove this. I leave the demagogy regarding "cheap bread" to those fans of cheap hamburgers who long for the "beautiful days of Bulgarian democracy."

I know that the expectations of our society are great. Those expectations must be satisfied. If not in 100 days, then within one to two years we must stop the destruction, so that at the end of our mandate, on the eve of the next millennium, we will be able to renew Bulgaria and face the new challenges. We have already assumed the commitments to form a better administration, curb the crime rate, activate our foreign policy, eliminate the pending danger of a financial fiasco, help Bulgarian farmers and free them from politicized bureaucratic arbitrariness, and improve the prospects of at least several branches of industry.

[DUMA] A member of your cabinet said that the right foot takes more steps when a turn to the left is executed. What does "leftist policy" (or "regulated market transition") mean in terms of the next state budget, which apparently will be formed by the old constituent law and by people who formed the previous budgets?

[Videnov] No miracles should be expected from the 1995 budget. After all, we have only two months to submit the draft budget to parliament! Nevertheless, we will try to combine two approaches—the standard approach, under which requests for budget expenditures are generalized and minimized so that they can conform to the macroframework; and the more professional approach, under which a maximum precise forecast of the possible revenue is made and political and governmental responsibility for distributing this revenue is assumed. The difference between us and our predecessors is obvious. We do not intend to blackmail our society with some real or imaginary diktat on the part of the international financial institutions or our native Bulgarian bureaucracy. We will place everything on the table and will try to make the Bulgarian citizens participants in adopting the most difficult decisions for our country.

In addition, we refuse to be monetarists. All the cabinet's efforts will not be directed toward dividing the miserable "monetary pie," but toward revealing new possibilities for rapid rejuvenation and lasting growth, and increasing the budget revenue. This is not related to savings but to investments in real production, trade, and banking.

[DUMA] Did the cabinet find in the governmental offices the information it needed for the White Paper it promised? At what stage of preparation is this paper? Were you surprised by some of the state problems you inherited? Is this heap of problems dangerous? Could the necessity of "fireman's" decisions such as the Dzherman-Skakavitsa water project mar the government's strategic view?

[Videnov] I found a completely empty archive at the prime minister's office. The head of my office inherited from his predecessor an incredible mess. As far as I

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know, all other members of the cabinet have encountered the same problem. This is no political sabotage. The state administration has simply functioned in a very bad manner in recent years. If you add to this the restoration insanity of Filip Dimitrov [former leader of the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS], the lack of political responsibility on the part of Lyuben Berov's cabinet, and the presidential adventures under Reneta Indzhova, you will have the full picture. We were not surprised. We waged a struggle in opposition, prompted new elections, and won them because we understood the situation, could not ignore it, and wanted to change it. Now is the moment to act, rather than lament. However, publishing a White Paper on the situation in our society is our duty to society. We are working intensively on this paper and will publish it as soon as possible.

[DUMA] The Socialists denied the claim that they would carry out purges, but cadre changes are nevertheless necessary. What criteria would lead you in this?

[Videnov] We are effecting significant cadre changes at present, but no one—including the opposition—views them as a purge. This is so because we do not aim at expelling this person or settling accounts with that person but simply at finding the most suitable persons for the grave mission awaiting us. In almost all cases until now the new cadre decisions have been sufficiently convincing. The changes speak for themselves and need not be defended. This will also remain the case in the future, because I believe in the just nature of our cadre policy's basic principles. Our first principle is to appoint people who are suitable for the post not because of their party position but because of their professionalism, political influence, and public authority. The second principle is empathy and support for the policy of the Democratic Left, which received the mandate of the voters. The third principle is the existence of personal trust among the members of the team.

[DUMA] Nevertheless, in certain cases you will have to take into consideration other criteria—for example, criteria of other branches of government and institutions. How would you resolve the problems of the magistrates, diplomats, high-ranking officers, and leaders of the national electronic mass media?

[Videnov] The legislative and judicial branches are independent, and the government should not interfere in their activity. However, we will put an end to the nepotism that has been encouraged in recent years in the high spheres of our diplomacy, defense, and security. I do not know if this is a matter of national treason. I do not like bombastic phrases, but adventurist and unprofessional personal decisions in those spheres inflicted great damage on our country. Bulgaria's foreign policy—which is European in nature and aimed at integration into the future security systems that are being formed now from the Atlantic to the Urals, and at maintaining peace along our borders and order in the country—will be formed strictly in accordance with the Constitution, by parliament and the government and not by any individual person.

[DUMA] The Democratic Left parliamentary faction adopted the priorities of its legislative activity. What will the cabinet's first legislative initiatives be, and what will be their goal?

[Videnov] According to an agreement with the parliamentary majority, the government assumed the commitment to introduce the draft bills on the Armed Forces, the struggle against organized crime, amendments to the Penal Code, the protection of agriculture, the social funds, and the national coat of arms before the introduction of the draft budget. We will resubmit to the National Assembly several of the 177 draft bills that we inherited from the previous governments. The rest is a matter of our legislative program. We will give priority to the bills on implementing the tax and banking reform, industrial restructuring, control in certain spheres, the laws related to our integration into Europe, based on our constitution, and of course the commitments we have to our voters.

[DUMA] The government is the center of the economic interests. Do you envisage some sort of control over your ministers in this respect, or would you trust their ethics?

[Videnov] Personal trust is very important to me. We have already decided, with the cabinet members, to inform the public periodically on our finances and property and the finances and property of our relatives. However, this is not enough. There have been personally honest people in all previous cabinets, but even they have allowed their positions, decisions, and actions to be influenced by hidden economic interests. The case of the caretaker cabinet was a special paradox. This cabinet (sincerely or not) declared war on certain interests, but in the final analysis it (willingly or unwillingly) served those interests in many specific cases. Transparency is the magic word. Let everyone publicly present, defend, and implement his position. Sometimes this position will serve the interest of our society, and the government will support it. In other cases it would contradict the public interest and we will act against it. However, no one should plan on any behind-the-scenes deals of any kind with the incumbent cabinet.

[DUMA] Who will lead the party from an operational point of view while you are leading the nation?

[Videnov] My deputies, who have been elected by the BSP Supreme Council, are now assuming much of the party's operational leadership. The Supreme Council itself, of which I was elected chairman by the 41st BSP congress, is capable of dealing with the most important tasks during the current year: the municipal elections, the BSP accountability-election campaign, and the all-party conference in July. I believe that in the next few months young people will join the party organization and organs at all levels, and will help us very much.

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Thus, I do not envisage any radical changes in the organization and work of the BSP Supreme Council, except perhaps in the various commissions. We need a stronger scientific basis, especially in political science and law; a more responsible organizational unit; and a more dynamic international activity.

[DUMA] Are office-seekers and flatterers trying to come closer to the new leaders, and what is your attitude toward such people?

[Videnov] I am indifferent toward them. I have a realistic opinion about myself and I adhere to it. It cannot be changed by outright flatterers or hysterical critics. I often have serious arguments with my closest friends, and I readily borrow good ideas from people whom I do not like very much. I hope to prove that I do not adopt important decisions under the influence of emotions either negative or positive. Power is a serious matter, which should not be utilized for personal rewards or penalties.

(DUMA] Do you see any danger for the process of changes in the BSP, which returned to power five years after 10 November 1989? How do you view the reports regarding the emergence of inner-party criticism and alternative approaches to adopting political decisions while the BSP is in power?

[Videnov] The BSP and the other groups of the Democratic Left should have "returned to power" much sooner, but this proved possible only after five years of a grave transition. Our common problem was that we could not stop the attack of restoration and prevent many of the misfortunes that afflicted the country. I am proud of the fact that already three years ago I called for a counteroffensive on the part of the leftist forces, and afterwards, for new elections, winning a victory in the elections and assuming full responsibility for governing the country. I have been in the minority and I have never been ashamed because of it. I have striven to understand the alternatives in order to become convinced that my position is a just one. Therefore, now I respect the minority's criticism and the alternative approaches to adopting decisions. This is not the problem the BSP faces while being in power. The danger lies in deliberately creating a distance from our party's policy, artificially producing conflicts—and in the malicious joy of the onlookers. However, all this seems hypothetical to me at present. I am optimistic about the future of the BSP.

Cabinet Raising Electricity Prices 1 Mar

AU1602114395 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 16 Feb 95

[Report by Kalina Stancheva from the Council of Ministers in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As of 1 March, electricity prices will rise by 33 percent on average. The price increases will be of 28.4 percent for industry and 47 percent for domestic consumers. As a member of a former government that did not venture to address this problem, and now as a member of a cabinet that has dared to do it, I am doubly committed to this problem. With these words, Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev announced today's decision.

Tsochev also explained the reasons: The increase in prices now will provide revenue to purchase energy sources during the summer, when they are cheaper, and finance repair and maintenance of the power system during the summer, which is the best time for doing this work.

Today Tsochev took over the chairmanship of the Interdepartmental Commission for State Energy Control, on which three committee chairmen and five ministers will serve. In addition, as of today, a national fund is being set up to allocate subsidies to aid the population in its use of electric and thermal power and solid fuels. This assistance will be arranged under an order adopted today ensuring that it is aimed at those in need and differentiated according to need.

Mincho Koralski, minister of labor and social welfare, is of the view that the maximum assistance needed according to forecasts will be provided for those in the greatest difficulty, on the basis of the guaranteed revenues. The cabinet resolved that the assistance will be provided in noncash form, so that it is not used for other so-called fuels—in quotation marks—instead of for solid fuels and electricity. [passage omitted]

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Havel Meets With Tunisian Foreign Minister

LD1502192695 Tunis Tunisian Republic Radio Network in Arabic 1800 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In Prague, President Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, has asked Mr. Habib Ben Yahya, the [Tunisian] foreign minister, to convey his feelings of respect and esteem to President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali for the tireless efforts he is making to strengthen democracy and development in Tunisia, a country that has become known for its stability and moderation.

During a meeting with Ben Yahya today, Havel said that the similarity between the Tunisian and Czech experiments in terms of economic and social development provided a platform for the strengthening of bilateral cooperation. [passage omitted]

Meetings have enabled the two sides to highlight the similarities between the Tunisian and Czech experiments in several fields, particularly at the economic and social level. The two sides stressed their common desire to strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation and explore opportunities for bilateral cooperation involving the private sector. In this respect, the two sides said they would consider convening a joint committee in 1996 with the participation of businessmen, describing the event as the best framework to bolster bilateral cooperation.

Moreover, the two sides expressed satisfaction with the noticeable increase in the number of Czech tourists coming to Tunisia, particularly in the past three years.

Ben Yahya's meetings with Czech officials gave him the opportunity to discuss with them numerous issues, including the relations Tunisia and the Czech Republic have with the European Union, security in the Mediterranean and Central Europe, the situation in the Arab Maghreb, the Middle East peace process, and the role played by Tunisia in its capacity as the current chairman of the Organization of African Unity. [passage omitted]

Kuwaiti Minister Recounts Meeting With Havel

LD1502154395 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1420 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague, 15 February—Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, first deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, today in Prague praised bilateral relations between the State of Kuwait and the Czech Republic.

In a statement for KUNA, Shaykh Sabah said that his meeting with Czech President Vaclav Havel reaffirmed the common desire to consolidate bilateral cooperation between the two countries. He said that he discussed with President Havel a number of issues of common interest, pointing out that the meeting continued the talks he had with the Czech prime minister earlier today. He said that during his meeting with President Havel, they reviewed aspects of political and economic cooperation between the two countries to benefit the Kuwaiti and Czech peoples.

Shaykh Sabah said that President Havel had reiterated his official invitation to the Kuwaiti amir, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, to visit the Czech Republic. The Czech president had extended an official invitation to the Kuwaiti amir during his short visit to the State of Kuwait last year. [passage omitted]

Discusses Iraq With Klaus

LD1502151295 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1253 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prague, 15 Feb—Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, first deputy prime minister and foreign minister, had a meeting this morning with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. They discussed a number of issues of mutual concern.

During the meeting, the two sides reviewed the latest developments in the Gulf region, the Iraqi regime's procrastination regarding the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to the war to liberate Kuwait, and ways of strengthening cooperation and friendship between the two countries.

The meeting, the first of its kind since the establishment of the Czech Republic in 1991, also dealt with a host of important current European and international issues. [passage omitted]

During his meeting with the first deputy prime minister and foreign minister, the Czech prime minister reaffirmed his country's firm and principled stance vis-a-vis the UN sanctions imposed on the Iraqi regime. In this context, he said that the Czechs have urged the Iraqi regime to implement all of the UN resolutions. He added that that regime is still prevaricating with regard to the implementation of the resolutions. [passage omitted]

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad and his accompanying delegation are expected to end their visit today and leave for Germany, the third stop in their 11-day tour.

Further on Iraq Discussion

LD1502214495 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1830 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah continued his visit to Prague. Asked what was the major issue discussed during his morning talks with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, the Kuwaiti foreign minister said:

[Begin al-Sabah recording, in Arabic with superimposed Czech translation] We talked with Prime Minister Klaus about the possibilities of economic cooperation between our countries. Sometime during next two months a Czech delegation involving experts from both the state

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and the private sector will go to Kuwait. The representatives of the government and businessmen will investigate concrete possibilities for investment in Kuwait. The representatives of our fund for development are, in return, preparing for their visit to the Czech Republic. The finances of this fund are used in many Arabic countries, particularly for the development of their infrastructure. [end recording]

Asked how the Kuwaiti Cabinet views the Czech Republic's stance on the attempts of certain countries to lift the sanctions against Baghdad, the Kuwaiti foreign minister said:

[Begin al-Sabah recording, in Arabic with superimposed Czech translation] In the Security Council, the Czech Republic holds the view that the sanctions should be lifted only after Baghdad complies with all of the points listed in the UN resolution. I personally am pleased about this attitude. The time is not yet ready for reconciliation.

If Iraq releases our prisoners of war and returns the possessions stolen from our country, there is no reason to insist on the sanctions any longer. We understand that the consequences of the embargo primarily effect ordinary Iraqi people who are not our enemies. Saddam and his clique bear responsibility for their suffering. The world must understand that our government cannot give in until Saddam returns what belongs to us. [end recording]

Disagreement on Loyalty of Army Officer Corps

AU1402182095

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 13 February on page 2 carries two items on the personnel situation in the Army under a common title "Altercations Regarding the Quality of Officer Corps Continue."

The first article, a 350-word, "km"-signed report entitled "The Spiritual Transformation Does Not Work, Fejfar Says," quotes Tomas Fejfar (Civic Democratic Party), deputy chairman of the parliamentary Defense and Security Committee, as saying that "the composition of the Army officer corps is not satisfactory." According to him, "many former political instructors and military counterintelligence agents are still working in the Army." The way of thinking has not changed in the Army, Fejfar says. Moreover, he adds, when the State Security disbanded, "military counterintelligence was subordinated to the Defense Ministry. Thus, its staff avoided all investigation by the civic commissions, and the screening law did not apply to hundreds of them." These people hold many important posts in the Army, he says.

The other item is a 300-word report, also "km"-signed, on Minister Vilem Holan's comments on this issue. According to the author, Holan claims that the number of former political instructors and military counterintelligence agents in the Army is constantly declining. While 6,500 of them served in the Army in 1990, three years later, according to Holan, the number was 2,000 men fewer, and it has declined further to approximately 1,600 since then." Moreover, according to Holan, "they work in positions that are not important." He added that "9,000 soldiers left the Army over the past two years," and, according to him, the disloyal ones are to be sought among those who left.

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Cabinet Council for EU Integration Appointed

LD1502221895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kalman, chairman of the Slovak Government Council for Integration Into the European Union, today handed over the letters of appointment to the 21 members of this body.

Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk was appointed deputy chairman of the body, while individual departments are represented by the state secretaries.

The council suspended the debate concerning the statutory and procedural rules, with the intention of assessing them at the next session.

Sitek, UK's Rifkind Talk Officially

LD1502140995 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Malcolm Rifkind, the British secretary of state for defense, arrived here today for a one-day working visit. Our colleague Miroslav Minar has just returned from the Slovak Defense Ministry, where the official talks between Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek and the British guest ended a few minutes ago.

[Begin recording] [Minar] [passage omitted]

During the meeting, Jan Sitek briefed his British counterpart on the Slovak Government's manifesto. He specifically pointed out Slovakia's orientation toward Atlantic security structures.

Malcolm Rifkind was interested to learn about some aspects of Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit to Slovakia. Sitek confirmed that our country was not trying to develop extraordinary relations with Russia. He said that cooperation in the military sphere was in accord with an ordinary agreement, similar to those signed by the Slovak Republic and other foreign partners.

Both officials devoted a lot of attention to the issue of NATO expansion, especially with regard to the proposal that the countries of the Visegrad Four should be admitted to NATO by 1999. Great Britain supports this ambition of the Central European countries. However, as Malcolm Rifkind confirmed, it is assumed that these countries will not be admitted to the alliance jointly and will be considered individually.

Both officials acknowledged the Partnership for Peace program as a basis for the gradual rapprochement of Central European countries with NATO. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Grant News Conference

LD1502215795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the talks with his Slovak counterpart, Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek, the program of the one-day visit paid by British Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind to Slovakia peaked when Rifkind was received by Slovak President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

In the presence of his host, the British guest informed journalists about the results of his meetings and talks held today. We bring you a telephone report by our colleague Miroslav Minar from the hotel Borik [in Bratislava]

[Minar] The afternoon program of the British guest started with a lunch, during which Defense Minister Rifkind met with Jozef Sestak, Slovak Foreign Ministry state secretary, and representatives of three opposition parties: Jozef Moravcik [chairman of the Democratic Union of Slovakia—DU], Jan Carnogursky [chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement—KDH] and Milan Ftacnik [deputy chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left--SDL].

During the meeting with Slovak constitutional officials—Slovak President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar—the issues concerning Slovakia's approach toward transatlantic security structures were discussed, particularly with respect to the recent Russian Government visit to Slovakia.

President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar jointly confirmed that Slovak foreign policy remained unchanged. Closer relations between Slovakia and NATO are literally our internal affair. Slovakia has no intention of creating a new Iron Curtain by joining NATO or of isolating Russia. We have to cooperate with Russia and take it into the consideration when we form new security structures in Europe.

In this context, the British defense minister said that NATO was in favor of developing healthy relations with Russia but that Russia should not decide who becomes a NATO member nor should it determine the timetable for admitting the countries of Central Europe to NATO. [passage omitted]

The news conference of both defense ministers is still in progress. For the listeners of Radiozurnal, I would like to recall Malcolm Rifkind's great pleasure about his short but busy visit to Slovakia. During his meetings and talks with Slovak officials, Rifkind was assured of sincere dedication to develop close cooperation on more than just defense issues.

Envoy to UK Views Slovak-Hungarian Relations

MS1602132795 London THE EUROPEAN in English 17-23 Feb 95 p 6

[Letter by Jan Vilikovsky, Slovak ambassador to the UK: "Cooperation Between Hungary and Slovakia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The situation in central and eastern Europe might be fraught with difficulties, but is it necessary to view developments in such a pessimistic light?

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("Seeking stability in Europe", 10 February) [not filed]. What evidence is there for Ian Mather's statement that "Hungary and Slovakia look like failing to Sign the treaty guaranteeing existing borders which Slovakia wants"?

This so-called "fundamental" bilateral treaty lays down the principles of neighbourly relations and cross-border co-operation between Hungary and Slovakia. The guarantee of existing borders was only a part (albeit an important one) of a larger whole.

Last August's meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries signalled a change of attitude and the Slovakian prime minister's visit to Hungary last month also brought concrete results. Both sides agreed to intensify preparation for the bilateral treaty and sign it before 21 March, the start of the Paris conference on the Stability Pact for Europe.

The treaty will enshrine the recognition of the existing common border and its inviolability. A separate agreement on the protection of national minorities will also be signed and this will form an appendix to the treaty.

Analysts tend to be sceptical. But no amount of scepticism should blind one to a genuine effort on both sides to overcome the inherited burden of the past, to seek a compromise that would not injure the fundamental interests of the other side and to set one's sights firmly towards the future.

Sitek Views Army's Orientation, Budget

AU1602123195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Feb 95 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek by Pavol Vitko; place and date not given: "The Budget Will Reflect the Kind of Army We Want"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Vitko] In your first speech last December, you refuted the doubts expressed about a change in our Army's political orientation. You confirmed that membership in NATO is its main objective. Despite this, there is a group of citizens and politicians that would be more satisfied with a line of Slovak military-political neutrality. How would you convince them that "our path does not lead in this direction"?

[Sitek] Although some opinions have been expressed here that Slovakia should not enter NATO, they are unacceptable to us. As far as neutrality is concerned, Slovakia has had no experience with it, and, moreover, the suitable international politico-security conditions have not been established for it in our region. After all, some traditionally neutral countries are gradually abandoning it. I saw this for myself, for instance, during my visit to Austria. I want to emphasize that the parties in the governing coalition adopted a policy statement that was approved by the National Council. Reference is made in the policy statement to our efforts to obtain membership in NATO and the EU. This government wants to follow up on the policy so far of Slovakia's rapprochement with Western structures. Is it necessary, therefore, to polemicize about possible neutrality? I personally think that it would just be a waste of time and energy.

[Vitko] In its rejected draft state budget, the Moravcik government wanted to earmark 12.9 billion korunas [Sk] for the Army. How much money from the state budget will be earmarked for the Army this year?

[Sitek] It is premature to talk about the state budget. The government will discuss it on 13 February, and the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] will give it the go-ahead later. Of course, I would be a bad minister if I were not to ask for as much as possible for my department. However, we have to proceed from the current economic situation. This means that the Army will receive enough money to "get by," but we cannot take any development programs into consideration. Even so, I envisage that we shall get at least this Sk12.9 billion.

[Vitko] The current "tabular" size of our Army is 52,000 personnel. This is not filled, however, and the Army has almost 10,000 fewer soldiers. Therefore, it will have no problems falling short of the maximum ceiling of 46,667 soldiers, as assigned to us by international agreements, by mid November. In view of the constantly declining real budget for the Slovak Army, the General Staff had a preliminary study drawn up according to which our Army should have just 35,000 soldiers. Do you consider it to be realistic that, because of the budget, there could be such a radical decline in the size of our forces?

[Sitek] In January, we submitted a report in the government on the fulfillment of the disarmament treaties. The Slovak Republic is fulfilling these treaties. The rest depends on the budget. The NR SR and the State Defense Council have to say what kind of army this Republic wants and adapt the finances to this. We are establishing modern armed forces; a relatively small but well trained Army. The concept for its transformation and construction has been worked out up to the year 2000. I consider it to be premature to concretize precisely what the size of the Army will be at that time. I will only repeat: It also depends on the budget.

[Vitko] Before the elections, reservations were repeatedly expressed from among the ranks of the current governing coalition about the personnel work at the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. Certain changes have been made at the ministry, but the Slovak Army has remained one of the few state institutions where there has not been, in essence, a personnel "earthquake" since the elections. Or is this in preparation?

[Sitek] We neither envisage nor are preparing any personnel "earthquakes." In filling posts in my previous position, I always gave preference to expertise because I think this course of action is the correct one. Therefore, I want to emphasize that only a few officials, who held political posts, have left the Defense Ministry. The government appoints and recalls them. We have reorganized the former Social and Humanitarian Affairs Section and have established a Section for the Development

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and Provision of Human Resources. It is true that some people were unable to apply their skills in the new structure. Each manager selects his group of coworkers according to his criteria; I merely supervise them and appoint the staff. I repeat, however, that I am not an advocate of political purges. Ability and expertise are what is important.

Businessmen's Union Holds Constituent Assembly

AU1502092895 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Feb 95 p 2

[TA SR report: "A New Political Entity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ruzomberok—Almost 100 delegates from 16 Slovak districts took part in the constituent assembly of the Union of Tradesmen, Businessmen, and Farmers of the Slovak Republic [Unie zivnostnikov, podnikatelov, a rolnikov—UZPR SR], which was held yesterday in Ruzomberok. The UZPR SR was registered as a political party at the Interior Ministry on 9 February. The split within the leadership of the Party of Businessmen and Tradesmen that emerged at the end of last year was the reason for its establishment. The Union says in its approved policy statement and articles that it will take part in creating a strong small and medium-sized business environment in Slovakia. Businessman Pavel Prokopovic from Stropkov was elected UZPR SR chairman.

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Ministry Budget Deficit Data, Prospects Viewed

AU1502145195 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 15 Feb 95 p 1

["Correspondent's report": "Budget Deficit in January: 21 Billion Forints"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The central budget deficit stood at 21.3 billion Hungarian forints [HUF] at the end of January 1995. The budget deficit for the first month of this year was 7.6 percent of the planned deficit for 1995, which is slightly lower than prorated.

Without the repayment of capital, last year, the parliament accepted a budget deficit of HUF282.6 billion for 1995. The deficit in the first month of 1995 was 7.6 percent of the planned deficit for the whole year, slightly lower than allocated—a Finance Ministry statement points out.

Besides, the government wants to reduce the state budget deficit. According to the experts, this deficit should be reduced by at least HUF50-60 billion. The Finance Ministry is formulating a package of measures this week, one intended to reduce the budget deficit and the deficit in the current balance of payments. This package of measures will probably be supplemented by the proposals of the new finance minister candidate, Lajos Bokros.

According to our information, contrary to previous plans, the government will not discuss the three-year economic program at its meeting this week, a program prepared with the coordination of Akos Balassa, deputy finance ministry state secretary.

The medium-range plan containing the conditions of economic stabilization and modernization will be included in the modernization program currently under preparation with the coordination of the Office of the Prime Minister. The government will probably discuss this joint proposal at the beginning of March. In addition to a medium-range economic plan, this joint proposal will contain, among other things, a political document on the strategy connected with the European Union [EU], the foreign ministry tasks originating from EU membership, and the preliminary version of the state budget reform.

According to the finance ministry report, the payments made by economic units into the state budget exceeded the predicted level by HUF9 billion, and this counterbalanced the loss of HUF10 billion caused by the delay in the payment of the first installment of privatization incomes scheduled for January. However, this surplus of HUF9 billion could not compensate other payment delays and, thus, as a whole, incomes did not reach the predicted level. Financial institutions paid hardly any taxes and dividends in January, and only 2.7 percent of the annual plan of incomes from international financial connections materialized. The budget organizations also paid little into the budget.

According to the report, the income-reducing effects of the tax repayments, the payment of deposits of the MAV Ltd, and the tax return obligations will probably modify the budget position in the coming months.

The budget had an income of almost HUF27 billion from the economic units in January. The higher-than-planned income in the first month of this year originated from customs and import dues and the general turnover tax. At the same time, less income originated from consumer taxes and personal income taxes.

In January, the central turnover funds had to finance the central budget deficit of HUF21.3 billion and the HUF77.2 billion originating from the maturity of credits, state bonds, and treasury bills. The budget issued state bonds worth HUF90 billion in the first month of 1995.

Bekesi Notes 'Spiraling Debt' Situation

LD1502182495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the outgoing finance minister [Laszlo Bekesi], state finances are in a situation of spiraling debt [adossag spiral]. The budget situation is deteriorating by 15-16 percent annually. Already, over one-third of outlays must be spent on debt repayments. Laszlo Bekesi said no economic growth is possible that will produce the incomes necessary for reducing the loans. He added that the only way out of this situation is by completing privatization quickly and spending the revenues from this on repaying the debts.

Goncz Warns Against Restrictive Economic Policy

LD1502221695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Arpad Goncz warns against the application of restrictive economic policy, which would slow down economic growth in Hungary.

Speaking at a press briefing for foreign journalists, the president said the main dispute among the parties lies in whether a shock therapy should be applied or measures should be taken to boost the economy. The president called attention to the fact that, contrary to earlier forecasts on economic recession, the gross domestic product grew by 3.5-4 percent in 1994.

HDUR Criticizes Romanian 'Anti-Hungarian' Stand

LD1502183295 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The discussion between Hungarians and Romanians in Atlanta is continuing behind closed doors, without the presence of the press.

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According to the organizers, on the first day of the meeting there was a lively exchange of views between the Romanian and [ethnic] Hungarian participants.

[Correspondent] In connection with the resolution of the Bucharest Chamber of Deputies attacking the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR], HDUR chairman Bela Marko said, at the Atlanta meeting: The resolution indicates that most political circles in Romania reject dialogue, and they conceal the problemsof the government coalition and society with anti-Hungarian hysteria. It is a conscious policy that is intended to aggravate the relationship between the Romanians and the Hungarians.

Honorary HDUR chairman Laszlo Tokes is of the view that the parliament did not find a better time than the roundtable discussions in Atlanta for adopting a position that is part of the anti-Hungarian campaign.

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Deputy Head of Presidential Office Resigns

LD1502181895 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1800 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Falandysz, deputy head of the presidential office, has resigned. The president's press office confirmed this report. The president's spokesman, Leszek Spalinski, told Polish radio that this was an independent decision made by Lech Falandysz.

Oleksy Outlines Planned Changes in Government

LD1502154995 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1500 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] An hour ago, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] signed a coalition agreement containing the full principles governing coalition activity and the new government program.

Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, who has undertaken the mission to form a new cabinet, stressed that the intention of the coalition is to simplify the government's structure and to reconstruct the economic administrative center.

Jozef Oleksy said that personnel decisions have not yet been made, but the coalition is seeking a significant simplification of the government structure. One deputy prime minister without portfolio will be appointed, who really will be the deputy to the prime minister. The government will be appointed as at present constituted by statute and, after three months, will be subjected to simplifying structural changes. This delay arises from the time that is needed to adopt statutory changes that, above all, will relate to the reconstruction of the government's economic administrative center, a reconstruction based on reducing the number of economic ministries.

As Jozef Oleksy said, these changes are a foregone conclusion. A constructive vote of no confidence, as a result of which the present government will be recalled and a new cabinet appointed, will probably be voted upon by the Sejm in a week's time. Before then, however, personnel issues must be clarified.

Speaker Jozef Oleksy also announced that he will hold a courtesy talk with the president. Jozef Oleksy said: I will seek the cooperation of the president. However, he did not give a clear reply to journalists' questions as to what he will do if he is unable to obtain this cooperation from the head of state.

Daily Sees Slim Possibility of Nonaligned Cabinet

WS1402142995 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 14 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "Nonaligned Cabinet—Not a Very Real Concept"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A nonaligned government backed by the present parliamentary opposition and by the coalition—that is, not only by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] but also by the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]—would exist until early parliamentary elections are held. The Freedom Union [UW] will try to form it if the mission undertaken by Sejm Speaker Olesky fails, Tadeusz Mazowiecki specifies the concept of his party. The SLD's Zbigniew Siemiatkowski and the PSL's Janusz Piechocinski: Speaker Oleksy will succeed, and, if he does not, early parliamentary elections will be necessary.

The UW National Council recalled on 12 February its proposal, which it first submitted in early February, calling for the establishment of a nonaligned government of experts. Details of this concept are now being worked out by a special anticrisis staff within the UW. Professor Jerzy Woznicki, a member of the staff, says that the draft has already been prepared along with initial proposals of some appointments. The prime minister of such a government would be a well-known person, active in public life, not identified with any party, and acceptable to the president.

"In the period of political tension, it would be a government not entangled in the presidential campaign," we were told on 13 February by UW Leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He believes that such a cabinet should be formed if the mission of Speaker Oleksy falls through. The UW leader expects that, in a vote, the government would be supported by all of the parliamentary groupings, including the SLD and the PSL. It would be a transition cabinet, one that would function until early parliamentary elections could be held.

As suggested by the SLD's Zbigniew Siemiatkowski and the PSL's Janusz Piechocinski, however, even if Oleksy's mission is unsuccessful, the PSL and the SLD will probably not back UW's concept. This means that the idea does not stand a chance of being put into effect.

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski: Speaker Oleksy will manage to form a government. If this does not happen, it will be only because of the president's destructive moves. Then we will need earlier parliamentary elections, and until that time, the country would be steered by the Pawlak Cabinet. We believe that the concept of a nonaligned government is to be a form of exerting pressure on the coalition to speed up the process of creating its cabinet.

Janusz Piechocinski: There is a chance that Speaker Oleksy will pull it off. Until that time, we will not discuss any other possibilities. If the formation of the government proves difficult, it will be necessary to ask voters for their opinions.

UW proposed establishing a nonaligned government of experts on 1 February, following the meeting of its leadership with the president, the same meeting after which it reported that Lech Walesa decided to unconstitutionally dissolve parliament and that, if this really happened, UW would try to bring the president before the State Tribunal.

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UW announced that formation of a nonaligned government was the only solution in this difficult situation and that it could protect the Sejm from being dissolved.

The first reaction of SLD Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski to this idea was negative. A government formed in a parliament is a party-related government. Forming a government outside parliament is contrary to the Constitution, he said.

Mazowiecki submitted the idea once again at the meeting of the Council of Elders on the following day, 2 February, when Lech Walesa asked the speakers their opinions on the dissolution of the parliament. The concept was firmly supported by the Union of Labor [UP]. Kwasniewski again did not speak about the proposal very favorably.

On 3 February, UW and UP invited representatives of extraparliamentary rightist groupings to the parliament. The invitation was accepted by leaders of the Center Accord, Christian-National Union, Conservative Party, Conservative Coalition, Peasant-Christian Party, and Zbigniew Religa's Party of Republicans. There were also representatives of the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms. It turned out that the right wing was ready to support a nonaligned cabinet of experts; however, the condition that they submitted was that the period of its functioning would be strictly specified—after the presidential elections. The parliament should dissolve itself, and such a government would exist until earlier parliamentary elections.

The idea was repudiated by the Union for Real Politics. According to its leader, such a cabinet would in reality be a camouflaged coalition of UW and the SLD. Voters of these parties would not be in a position to accept an open alliance of these two parties.

Unofficial List of New Coalition Ministers

LD1502221595 Warsaw TVP Television Second Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The leaders of the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] and the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] have signed an amended coalition agreement. The document is entitled: The 1995 PSL-SLD Coalition Agreement. This means that consultations that are to determine the composition of the government have started.

[Correspondent Wojciech Nomejko] [Passage omitted] According to unofficial information that "Panorama" has managed to confirm with three independent sources close to the coalition, the Democratic Left Alliance will receive nine ministries in Jozef Oleksy's government, while the Polish Peasant Party will receive eight.

Apart from the prime minister, the Left will have the following departments:

Justice—Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz

Finance—Grzegorz Kolodko

Labor—Leszek Miller or Anna Bankowska

Construction—Barbara Blida

Privatization—Wieslaw Kaczmarek

Health—Jacek Zochowski

Transport—Boguslaw Liberadzki

The head of the Council of Ministers Office will also be from the SLD.

The Peasants will staff the following departments:

Communications—Stanislaw Popiolek

Agriculture—Roman Jagielinski

Environmental Protection—Jan Komornicki

Education—Jan Gorecki

Culture—Zdislaw Podkanski

Foreign economic cooperation—Jozef Lochowski or Andrzej Malinowski

They will also provide the heads of the Central Planning Office and the Scientific Research Committee, as well as the deputy prime minister without portfolio. The last post is to go to Aleksander Luczak.

Marek Pol is likely to be minister of industry.

The three so-called presidential departments will be staffed by people from outside the coalition.

Daily Comments on New Coalition Agreement

WS1602122695 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 16 Feb 95 p 5

[Commentary by Bozena Wawrzewska: "Survival in a New Cart"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The coalition has signed the long-awaited renewed agreement defining the principles of cooperation. This is unquestionable proof of their will to uphold the coalition, but on more precise terms. Several issues were detailed facilitating the decision-making process within the coalition. The points of the program, apart from few exceptions, do not bring anything new.

The most significant of these exceptions is probably a more clearly stated will to enter NATO.

What is most disquieting about the deal are provisions on what was once referred to as the "superstructure." There are numerous clauses on establishing committees and teams that are to analyze, investigate, and deal with

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issues that are often quite obvious (for instance, an analysis of the feasibility of having direct elections for heads of gminas [smallest administrative unit]). Such solutions always lead to an overgrowth of the administration and ancillary bodies. They also point to a disregard for hard facts. Demands for more influence on the filling of particular posts, which is beyond the prerogatives of the government and parliament, are reminiscent of the *nomenklatura* of old. The previous agreement did not provide for such solutions. It recognized the possibility of appointing highly qualified professionals to particular offices regardless of their party membership.

The public relations policy of Pawlak's team and its attitude toward the media were widely criticized. Yet formulating principles of, for instance, "defining methods and trends of exerting influence so as to gain greater influence on the public media, and modeling the domestic information circuit by applying existing legal instruments, including the provisions of the radio and television bill" is more than disturbing. It reflects not a school of thinking in terms of free press and public television, but a tendency to gain more influence by direct control, by hand-steering.

The cart the coalition is to pull seems to be carrying the same load, only restacked. This is particularly true in regard to the economy. New elements that have emerged, "new programmatic stimuli" as they were called in the opening sentences of the agreement, raise the burning question of where this cart is going. Especially as personal issues—the fact that the same names continue to reappear and that the same ties and party loyalties are in the fore—lead one to assume that the changes in government policies will be artificial rather than substantial.

Daily Says Russia To Sign Accord on Arms, Trade

WS1502123895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Jan Rozdzynski from Moscow, with Marzena Mazurkiewicz and "LUZ": "Secrets of Agreement; What Will Poland and Russia Discuss?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Will a Polish-Russian governmental agreement on military-technological cooperation be signed during Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit? At the National Defense Ministry [MON], we learned that it would. The Russian deputy prime minister denies this. The Polish side is keeping the information secret. Is it because the agreement will make our prospects for joining NATO look bleaker?

Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin is coming to Poland on 17 February. As we reported yesterday, politicians of the Conservative Party [PK] revealed information in line with which, during his visit, Poland and Russia are to sign a governmental agreement on long-term military-technological cooperation. The agreement envisions, among other things, close cooperation in the area of military-equipment production, delivery of subassemblies and certain Russian products (approximately 90 percent of the equipment used by our Army was made in the Soviet Union).

According to the conservatives, the agreement will dangerously increase Poland's dependence upon Russia; it may also make it impossible for Poland to join NATO.

According to Pawel Zalewski, a KK politician, the agreement was negotiated with the Russians by representatives of two Polish ministries: the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation.

Information on the agreement was borne out yesterday by Colonel Wieslaw Leszek, press officer in MON's Department of Deliveries. He told ZYCIE WARSZAWY that the Polish-Russian agreements will include an accord on "long-term military-technological cooperation." However, he was not able to specify exactly how many years the agreement would be binding.

Meanwhile, Oleg Davydov, Russian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign economic cooperation, told a ZYCIE WARSZAWY correspondent in Moscow that "the signing of an agreement on military-technological cooperation is not scheduled" for the Chernomyrdin visit.

The governmental agreement is a document of a lower level than a treaty; however, it stands higher than an interministerial agreement. It concerns specific issues and does not need to be ratified. A governmental agreement is effective on the day it is signed.

In the Government's Press Office we found out that the main Polish negotiator was the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry. Its spokesman, Zbigniew Ostrowski, did not confirm this information.

"The agreement is to concern military equipment; thus, it should be handled by MON and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. If officials of the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry had participated in the negotiations with the Russian partner, I would have been informed about it," Ostrowski told ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

In the Ministry of Industry and Trade, we were told that the ministry had not participated in the final negotiations. The Defense Department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade decided, however, to withhold information on the details of the negotiations "at this stage." [passage omitted]

Davydov failed, however, to mention that negotiations are now under way in Moscow between the Russians and a Polish delegation, consisting of over a dozen representatives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and MON. The subject of the discussion is the following: "commodity transactions in the sphere of special production." Negotiations between Poland and Russia on this subject have been going on for quite some time now, and each partner

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has been defending his own position. So far both sides have been trying to work out an agreement between the governments; the negotiations have not reached the level of specific decisions.

One can guess, however, that the more specific discussions will concern deliveries of spare parts to military equipment made in the Soviet Union and used by the Polish Army. There is also another possibility: deliveries of spare parts and subassemblies manufactured in Poland, based on Soviet technologies, to Russia. Another issue that can be discussed is the possibility of Poland's reexporting these technologies to other countries.

It is difficult to predict when the talks will be concluded. The possibility cannot be ruled out, however, that, during Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's visit to Warsaw, one of the topics discussed will be the present stage of these negotiations. During the talks in Warsaw, both prime ministers may decide that both sides should take less adamant stands than they have so far. It is also possible, however, that they will not bring up the issue of the "commodity transactions in the sphere of special production" at all, or that they will adopt even firmer positions.

Comment on Military Trade With Russia, Security

WS1502151495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Feb 95 p 1

[Commentary by Bronislaw Wildstein: "Dangerous Secrets"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft of the military agreement that is to be signed by the Governments of Poland and Russia is being kept in strict secrecy. This alone can cause justified concern. A government that has been formed by postcommunist parties should be aware of the suspicions that can be aroused by arrangements made with their former principals in Moscow. Therefore, it should do its best to see to it that these arrangements are clear and unequivocal.

[Foreign] Minister Olechowski said unambiguously that the Pawlak government is only officially heading for integration with NATO. This has recently been confirmed by statements from Western politicians. What is more, Poland has not seized the opportunity to purchase the latest U.S. military technologies. The Czechs and the Hungarians have seized their opportunity. Modernization of the Army is a necessary condition to join NATO.

The official reason for Poland's refusal to make the purchase was its concern over the domestic arms industry, which, incidentally, is incapable of manufacturing the equipment that has been offered to us. If the price for favoring a Polish arms factory is to be security of the entire state, then such a policy must be termed worse than nearsightedness.

We already know that the military agreement with Russia is to be binding for many years and to be concluded at the highest governmental level. The fact that it is shrouded in secrecy can lead to the suspicion that entrepreneurs linked to the Polish Peasant Party are interested in military trade with Russia, just as much as they are interested in agricultural trade with this country. We should demand that this issue be clarified immediately because in this case our national security is at stake.

Local Government Reform Is Democratic Base

MM1602105595 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 8 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Ryszard Rybus: "Time to Finalize Reform: Democracy Is Born in the Parish"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The government forgets that it owes it largely to parishes that people are not yet coming out onto the streets," Stanislaw Kracik, mayor of Niepolomice, insists.

As a rule, local authorities come out in much better light than their central equivalents in opinion polls conducted by the Public Opinion Study Center [CBOS].

A strong tendency to return to the suburbs and the smaller cities has been observed for a long time now in postindustrial societies. What it signals is not just a quest for cleaner air but a more general one, for a friendly environment. Including a socially friendly environment.

So why is the Polish local self-government system, which is only five years old, already going through a crisis—a crisis that began almost at the very moment of its inception?

How To Handle a Parish

The 1990 local self-government reform was supposed to do away with the decades-old division of society into "we, or the public" and "they, or the authorities"—do away with it at least at the local level.

In the parish of Niepolomice, presided over by Kracik and regarded throughout the country as an ideal model of successful local self-government rule, no one yet speaks in terms of "our self-government" or "our council." On the other hand, many people refer all the time to "our mayor." This is because the nationwide fame earned by the parish is in effect to be credited to the vision of one man who has found the right method to run the affairs of a local community.

The mayor of Niepolomice himself stresses that he had no previous experience in "public and political activity" during the Polish People's Republic [PRL] era. He stresses that because it kept him from acquiring the bad habits of that period. And also from becoming dispirited. When the time of democracy and self-government rule came about, Kracik took up the challenge even though the management of his own private business would have given him just as much satisfaction. But can a man shirk

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the opportunity of taking not just his own fate, but also that of the whole local community, into his hands?

When, back in 1990, Kracik assumed the office of mayor, the first thing he noticed was the lethargy of the local officials and their policy of securing themselves against responsibility for their decisions. He was afraid lest he end up "sucked into" the existing, established setups. So he decided to...dismiss everyone in his authority. And no, it was not because he simply wanted to carry out a purge. Because he then reemployed almost everyone again. However, this time around it was he who was deciding to accept them as his officials: He was no longer a new boss seeking acceptance from an established framework of setups and interdependences.

The move was, however, basically a sociotechnical tactic that facilitates the running of any establishment, whereas the essence of successful management of local self-government structures is to be found elsewhere. The strategy according to which Kracik discharges his duties as mayor contains all the elements of sound business management. Let us take, for example, the question of transmission of information within the parish and its outside promotion. The purchase of airtime from Krakow Radio for the presentation of a regular weekly program on parish affairs was a move that not only answers the need for broadcasting information among all Niepolomice inhabitants but also builds up their collective morale and sense of community. This is because, as Kracik is well aware, the source of successful local self-government operation is essentially to be found in the ability to reach all members of a local community.

It is only too clear that the past decades of centralism have destroyed the sense of local identity for local communities. They disrupted the network of local links and ties. And that is why, as Kracik argues, it is vitally necessary that the first step in the program aimed at restoring local self-government rule must be to reawaken in the people the ability to identify, initially not even with their parish, but with the immediate village or settlement where they live.

Soon the world of politics came to claim Kracik. Precisely so. It was not as if he himself had sought political office or at least a specific political orientation to join: The Krakow branch of the (then) Democratic Union quickly noted the exceptional talents shown by the mayor of Niepolomice in the field of local self-government as well as other areas, and offered him a place in its own ranks and... the privilege of representing the party as parliamentary deputy. In this way Kracik probably stands in our country as the precursor of a model of public career that has long been commonplace and universally followed in the countries with advanced democratic systems: from activity in local self-government structures to the assumption of state offices.

If we were to say simply that local self-government is the kindergarten in which democracy acquires its first skills, it would probably sound too much like a slick slogan, and people might come to the conclusion that such a formulation was not to be treated seriously. Nevertheless, it is true insofar as the democratic system will never master its necessary skills if it has not first learned them from local self-government.

As Little Politics as Possible

Despite the generally positive assessment of the achievements of local self-government to date, a considerable atmosphere of lethargy still prevails in local communities, where "grassroots" initiatives are few and far between and election turnout figures are frighteningly low. The burden of the past is still weighing people down....

In the parish of Krzeszowice they have actually sampled the taste of the new opportunity. When a "working version" of a map of the proposed configuration of new districts was unveiled in 1993, the city experienced a whirlwind of emotions aroused by the local self-government's aspiration to decide the parish's own future. "What sort of idea is this? Are we supposed to come under the Chrzanow district administration again? But Chrzanow belongs to Katowice Voivodship! And we can actually see the towers and spires of Krakow from the hills around Krzeszowice when the weather is good!"

Today, when dead silence shrouds the issue of the district reform, the memory of those days, with their feverish activities aimed at getting Krzeszowice onto the district map again, has faded to some extent. But at the time Krzeszowice was indeed working itself up to fever pitch in its effort to realize its aspiration to be officially restored to the status of a district seat. It was not easy: First of all, there was the absence of historically confirmed tradition (although some evidence for it does exist, it is a very ancient trace), and, far more importantly, not all the neighboring parishes were inclined to follow Krzeszowice's aspirations. And there would have had to be five parishes willing to join in the scheme to make the district campaign viable.

"The administrative reform should be started from drawing up a map of the future voivodships," Wieslaw Jagiello, mayor of Krzeszowice, insists.

And he also believes that "it is a good thing that the district reform has been postponed." This is because it is first necessary to regulate all questions concerning parishes' powers and finances.

"Since 1990 the parish budget financing system has been steadily declining. Parish resources are being cut while the range of tasks with which they are entrusted is widened. And that happens regardless of who is in power in the country at the given time."

Jagiello has held the mayor's office since last year's local elections, but he has been involved in local self-government since its beginning—that is, 1990—as a member of the local council. At that time he ran for office as a candidate from the Citizens' Committees list.

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Today he describes his political views as more right-oriented, although in 1994 he ran as candidate from the nonpolitical Parish Self-Government Pact. He favors the view that there should be no active party politics at the parish level, although he admits that it is not possible to eliminate that aspect altogether.

Have the parish and its inhabitants benefited in real and tangible ways from changing its administration system to that of self-government? Certainly the water and gas supply systems have been extended (in 70 percent), although much of the work had been done in the years preceding the administrative reform. The roads look much better now, 40 percent of the parish roads having received new, reinforced surface. Have there been any failures? These are recorded primarily in the housing construction sector. Public housing was nonexistent even before the reform, and now the cooperative housing has come to an end, too. By now only the private housing sector is left in the field, and this is undergoing another boom at the moment.

Mayor Jagiello has very clear views on the question of the administrative reform. To begin with, certain fundamental issues must be resolved first: the aforementioned questions of parishes' powers and the financing of parish budgets. Next, it will be necessary to reduce the number of voivodships and at the same time extend the range of competence within voivodas' remit. This should be done at the expense of the so-called special administrations, which are absurdly overgrown; finally, the time will come for addressing the question of new districts.

Sociologists and political scientists point out that the question whether democracy will eventually become the norm in society's regular daily existence will ultimately depend on the rules of play that are applied in small local communities. It is really at that level that the stipulated ideal of citizens' society takes its decisive shape. That is why the finalization of the local self-government reform must not become the scene of a politically provoked skirmish but must, instead, preserve its role as an indispensable element of a democratic social order.

Feb Opinion Poll Confirms Kuron's Popularity

WS1602115695 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 16 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by "P.P.": "CBOS: Jacek Kuron Still Most Popular. The Indisputable Leader"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Jacek Kuron from the Freedom Union [UW] still remains the most trusted politician. As many as 78 percent of those polled by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] in February place their trust in him. The subsequent positions were taken by Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy (60 percent), leader of the Democratic Left Alliance Aleksander Kwasniewski (58 percent), and Ombudsman Professor Tadeusz Zielinski (56 percent). Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Andrzej Olechowski suffered the largest slide in popularity ratings.*

Although Jacek Kuron remains the indisputable leader in the popularity polls, the distance dividing him from the other politicians has slightly narrowed. In comparison with the poll carried out in January, the largest growth in popularity was noted in the case of Professor Adam Strzembosz, first president of the Supreme Court (from 22 to 31 percent), Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko (from 38 to 44 percent), and UW leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki (from 44 to 50 percent).

Pawlak lost many points in the eyes of the citizens: His popularity fell by 7 percent and is now 48 percent, which places him in seventh place. The level of trust for Lech Walesa is stable. Just like in January, 34 percent of those polled trust him, yet one-half do not believe in his good intentions, ranking him first in this regard. Poles are nearly equally distrustful of Lech Walesa's close associate, Belweder Minister Mieczyslaw Wachowski (42 percent).

Professor Tadeusz Zielinski boasts the highest average ranking. The fact that he is ranked only fourth is due, according to CBOS, to the fact that a huge number (26 percent) of those polled did not know who he was.

NBP: Zloty Devaluation Rate May Be Reduced

WS1502133695 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 15 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by M.I. and A.M.: "NBP Will Lower Zloty Devaluation Rate; In Defense of 17-Percent Inflation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is possible that the monthly devaluation rate of the zloty will soon be reduced. However, according to the central bank, there are no grounds for making a decision on reducing the interest rates of the National Bank of Poland [NBP].

"The specific date for lowering the devaluation rate cannot be revealed yet," stated NBP First Vice President Witold Kozinski. The vice president emphasized that such a decision is possible now that the government has announced that it will take appropriate steps to curb the price increases seen recently.

Witold Kozinski believes that, as a result of slower devaluation, the money supply will start decreasing; right now the supply is on the increase due to growing foreign currency reserves. Such a decision would also cause the prices of imported products to fall. "However, we must be careful when we want to lower the devaluation rate. Such a step can impede imports, which, in turn, would force us to increase the devaluation rate," stated Witold Kozinski.

Despite that, the NBP vice president can see no reason for lowering the NBP interest rates. "The inflation indicator in January turned out to be higher than the government planned; in addition, now that an agreement has been reached with trade unions, allowing wage increases in 1995 to reach 23.5 percent, reduction of the interest rates is out of the question," Kozinski said. He

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also added that, while trying to keep inflation down at the level of 17 percent in 1995, the central bank may even be forced to raise interest rates, unless the government manages to curb price increases and avert an uncontrolled wage increase. "It would not be a manifestation of a lack of faith in the realization of the goals that have been planned; it would in fact be an attempt to defend them," he stressed. Finance Deputy Minister Krzysztof Kalicki told NOWA EUROPA that raising the interest rates will cause the prices of credits to go up, which means that the costs of companies' activity will be higher. In addition, it will also result in higher prices. Kalicki stated that the costs of financing the budget will increase as well. The budget law has not been signed, and the government has difficulties getting money from the NBP.

Foreign Economic Cooperation Minister Leslaw Podkanski is against lowering the devaluation rate. "Such a decision involves the risk of limiting Poland's exports and threatens to cause an increase in imports—not only in technological imports but also in the imports of consumer goods and services," Podkanski said.

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Chebeleu, Marko Assess 'Frank' Atlanta Talks

AU1502133095 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Dispatch from Atlanta, Georgia by Mircea Podina]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Podina] Esteemed listeners, yesterday evening U.S. Eastern Standard Time—which is already morning in Bucharest—at the end of the first day of talks between representatives of the Hungarian community and certain Romanian public figures from our country, a dialogue conducted at the Carter Center in Atlanta and moderated by the Project on Ethnic Relations, a nongovernmental U.S. organization supported by private donations, presidential spokesman Traian Chebeleu told us the following:

[Begin Chebeleu recording] Today we began our roundtable discussions, which were covered quite extensively by the media—much more so than similar talks of this kind. At this time, I can only say that we have had several good hours of frank, and occasionally harsher, talks. However, I believe that today's discussions, as well as these kinds of talks in general, help to clarify the problems and better understand the viewpoints expressed by both sides, and their motivation. Therefore, at the end of this first day, I would say that the talks were useful. We will continue them tomorrow and we will see then whether we are able to make any progress at all and say something more than: We have had yet another occasion to talk.

I would like to add here that the organizers—primarily the moderator of this roundtable, Mr. (Allen Kassoff), director of the U.S. program that sponsors this meeting—reiterated, to make it clear to all participants, that this is a free exchange of views, that all the roundtable participants came here as private persons, that the talks do not in anyway commit the institutions to which the participants belong, and that the entire endeavor is devoted to clarifying problems that have created certain tensions and misunderstandings in our society.

The idea is that these matters should be clarified by competent representatives of both sides through this free exchange of views. [end recording]

[Podina] In turn, Bela Marko, president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] and a UDMR senator in Romania's parliament, made the following statement:

[Begin Marko recording] Actually we agreed among ourselves not to release many details about today's discussions. Therefore, I can only make comments of a general nature. Of course, we discussed all the problems that are most urgent and important for us. I would say that the discussions were very frank and at times quite heated, which was only to be expected since we did not come here with a consensus; on the contrary, there are a number of differences, as everybody knows. We also briefly discussed the current political context in the country. As a matter of fact, we reviewed the problems that should be discussed and resolved in the legislative sphere, such as the law on education and the law on minorities, as well as other problems that cannot be solved by legislative means but in other ways. [end recording]

[Podina] Today, on the second and last day of the dialogue, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter will participate in part of the discussions—only in his capacity as host, without actually intervening at all in the exchange of views among the roundtable participants.

Army Looks to Israel, U.S. for Modernization

AU1502190995 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 11-12 Feb 95 p 16

[Article by Doru Iordache and Oana Majuga: "The Romanian Army Looks to the United States and Israel To Modernize Its Air Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

MiG-21's and MiG-23's Will Be Equipped With "Friend-Enemy" Recognition Devices

The Air Force is sending its MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter planes to Israel for technological upgrading so that they can be brought up to the level of modern fighter planes. Consequently, MiG-21 and MiG-23 planes are being gradually sent to Israel for modernization. They will be equipped with "friend-enemy" recognition devices and transponder appliances, which can post the position of the fighters on the secondary radars of the civilian aviation.

Half of the 431 Romanian fighter planes are MiG-21's. From a technical viewpoint, the planes are operational until 2010-15.

Next May, in a first display of the improved MiG-21's new performance, the pilots will attempt to prove the plane's compatibility with the U.S. F-16. We point out that this type of plane is still being used by other armies. The total number of MiG-21 planes around the world is 5,000.

One hopes that after assimilation of the due production processes, Romania will be able to service many of these planes in its two repair factories, thus covering its own modernization expenses.

Pentagon Agrees To Sell "Bell" Helicopters to Romania

As regards helicopters, in keeping with extant understandings, the Romanian Air Force must equip itself with both transport and combat helicopters. The talks with the United States in this respect are proceeding positively. Romania is trying to purchase Bell helicopters on the U.S. market. Both the Pentagon and the Romanian side have endorsed this transaction. However, the possibility of turning the Bell helicopter from a transport machine into a fighter helicopter is still on the agenda.

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The Balance Sheet of the General Staff of the Air Force and Air Defense A meeting to draw up the balance sheet of the activity of the General Staff of the Air Force and Air Defense took place on 7 February 1995. The participants discussed the leadership qualities and working style of the commanders and general staffs; the strategic, operational, tactical, and air and ground combat preparedness of large and regular Air Force and Air Defense units, and their state of efficiency and intervention capacity. The meeting examined technical activities and matters pertaining to ensuring military order and discipline. It also discussed the activity carried out at all levels—logistics, housing, healthcare, and finances—to ensure the necessary training and education of troops, in keeping with requirements.

Leader Cerveni Suspended From PNL-CD

AU1502190895 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Mediafax: "Niculae Cerveni Suspended From the PNL-CD"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The former spokesman of the PNL-CD [National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention] announced on 9 February that the PNL-CD Provisional Standing Bureau has decided to suspend [PNL-CD leader] Niculae Cerveni. The Bureau includes five people whom Niculae Cerveni in turn also excluded from the PNL-CD. According to Dimitrie Calimachi, the Bureau reproaches Cerveni the adventurous way in which he is leading the party, as well as his political inconsistency and lack of honesty. Calimachi also accused his former friend of agreeing to form an alliance with the National Liberal Party, National Liberal Party '93, and Civic Alliance Party only because he received a house from the general mayor of Bucharest.

PUNR Members Condemn Recent Funar Statements

AU1502204495 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 10 Feb 95 pp 1, 10

[Unattributed report: "Dirty Laundry Is Washed in the Family, So One Gets Out With a Clean Funar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The monolithic unity around the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] and its beloved leader Gheorghe Funar portrayed in official communiques looks a bit different in reality. One can also see this from the statements that were made behind closed doors at the meeting of the PUNR Standing Bureau on 6 February 1995. Someone happened to be eavesdropping, and here is what he heard:

Valer Suian (PUNR executive secretary and vice president of the Senate): "Gheorghe Funar simply ignored our recommendations, as well as everything that was agreed upon seven months ago. At that time, he was told clearly not to issue any declaration on behalf of the party. His statements, as you all know, have had only negative consequences for PUNR. I am talking about hazardous and reckless declarations. It should be clear that I can no longer keep quiet and cover for him. This can no longer go on like this, Mr. Funar! I cannot agree to what you are doing! Mr. Funar ignores the opinion of everyone in the PUNR Bureau, while forgetting that the entire party is responsible for his actions. We gave Iliescu an extremely good opportunity to call Funar a mentally sick person."

Corneliu Balan (deputy): Mr. Funar, I believe that some of your very malevolent advisers—who want to destroy the party—persuaded you to make very serious mistakes, which we are currently discussing. By your declarations, you have done nothing except give the Hungarians ideas. Even if you apologized now, no one would believe you. The only solution would be for you to resign from the position of [PUNR] president and come back strong in two years, if you must.

Gheorghe Funar: "I am not resigning, sir. I am going about my business!"

Ioan Joarza (senator, head of the PUNR parliamentary group): "What seems most serious to me is the fact that we no longer have friends. It should be clear that we have nothing to gain from irritating President Ion Iliescu. On the contrary!"

Augustin Crecan (senator): "Dear colleagues, I would like to tell you that other colleagues as well—such as Mr. Adrian Motiu, who came back from the European Parliament—are very angry with Mr. Funar and his communiques."

Mircea Vaida (PUNR spokesman): "I see that Gheorghe Funar has again committed a serious violation of party discipline. It should be clear that the president cannot issue personal declarations just because he is the symbol of the party. It should be clear to you that you are not allowed to issue statements on behalf of the party. This is not good. And what's more: It is a mistake."

Ioan Gavra (vice president): "I not only scolded Gheorghe Funar for what he did but even cussed him out. Those who counsel Funar are defective, mentally retarded. Mr. Funar, do you not understand that there is no way they could come up with normal ideas? They are incapable of that, because this is the limit of their horizon."

Police Seize Smugglers With 24 Kg Heroin

AU1602114495 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 14 Feb 95 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Heroin Seizure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Five drug traffickers carrying 24 kg of heroin have been seized at Timisoara. They are four Bessarabians [citizens of the Republic of Moldova] and Maxim Constantin Roman, a 26-year-old inhabitant of Timisoara. The traffickers are themselves drug addicts. The largest quantity of heroin was found on a Bessarabian woman. They had purchased the drugs in Turkey and intended to sell them in Spain.

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Ganic: Lift FRY Sanctions If Borders Closed

AU1502201595 Paris AFP in English 1946 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 15 (AFP)—The Bosnian Government would go along with a Western plan to lift most sanctions against Serbia, provided borders between the two ex-Yugoslav republics are "absolutely closed," a senior official said here Wednesday.

Under the scheme, proposed by France, sanctions would be ended on condition that Belgrade recognized Bosnia and Croatia as independent states. "My understanding is that if Serbia recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if the borders are absolutely closed, we will not complain," Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Croat-Moslem Federation, told AFP.

"It will require that borders be closed for supplies and troops," Ganic said, adding that the frontier would have to be monitored under "an agreement with the international community and the Contact Group."

Sarajevo is concerned about the passage of military equipment and troops from Serbia to the Bosnian Serbs locked in conflict with the Moslem-led Bosnian forces. The plan to end sanctions has won backing from France's four sister nations in the Contact Group on Bosnia—Britain, Germany, Russia, and the United States.

Recognizing Croatia and Bosnia would dash Belgrade's hopes of creating a "Greater Serbia." Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic has said recognition of his state by Serbia and Montenegro, the rump Yugoslavia, is a condition for his attending a future peace summit with his Serbian and Croatian counterparts.

Karadzic Address to 13 Feb Assembly Session

AU1502163795 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 95 p 2

[Address by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to the Srpska republic assembly in Bosanski Samac on 13 February, "prepared exclusively" by Goran Rosic: "We Are Prepared To Kiss the Boot; Just Show Us the Boot We Should Kiss"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have been asked to disappear. Should we do so? If someone wants us to disappear, then he will have to dirty his hands, he has to come here and kill us all. It is immoral to ask us to destroy ourselves, to destroy our country. We will not do that. We have the right not to do that. We are offering an alternative. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, what belongs to whom has always been known, and we want what is ours for ourselves since Bosnia-Herzegovina left Yugoslavia illegally. The Contact Group is trying to devise ways to achieve the goals that it has been set. We have always known that the negotiators are clerks who have been told to preserve Bosnia as a state, to end the war here as soon as possible, and then to move in on Serbia, particularly on Kosovo—mark my words. We know that this should have happened in the summer of 1992, but we put up resistance for longer than they planned, so now they have postponed it until perhaps the summer of 1995.

Gentlemen, this is an assembly in which anything can and should be said, and by which policies are approved. Do we have to confuse our people by going anywhere, including Belgrade—which we consider to be our capital—and then appearing before our public as if our leadership is either idiotic or criminal? I have to ask about these words in this letter (the letter from the Independent deputy caucus, addressed to Karadzic and Krajisnik). If this is true, then we should be put on the agenda. I thought the letter would be different, and I did not expect to have to say anything regarding this letter. The letter is so provocative that it demands a discussion at least in this assembly if not in public. I do not want to hold discussions with deputies in public when we can discuss things to our heart's delight here. Here it says that we "are behaving irresponsibly when it comes to war and peace." The question of war and peace is a question for the assembly. The constitution has regulated the question of war and peace. If the assembly thinks that we can stop the war unilaterally and give ourselves up, then the assembly should vote so. But please, what are the political and personal moves that we have been making and that concern our entire nation? There is nothing this assembly does not know. Carter came, and we managed to accomplish a favorable formula. Then the Contact Group came with the same formula. On the first day, they came with the paper that we saw was shown to the deputies that met the Contact Group. We told them clearly that there would be no negotiations if that paper remained on the table, and they withdrew it. They put it back into the game only after contacts with the group of so-called independent deputies. We refused even to talk about this paper, since it said in its first sentence that "prosperity will be guaranteed to the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina," and we do not want to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This letter here says that "it is essential that the assembly determines further standpoints for negotiations, and the priorities in the territorial demarcation, since it is clear from your hitherto activities that you have not taken equal care of all the parts of the Srpska republic, but have rather displayed favoritism toward some parts and neglected Krajina, Semberija, and Posavina." The Serb people are prone to divisions. We have avoided political divisions so far. Are regional divisions supposed to be introduced quietly now? Our Krajina is the most compact and largest part of our country. We compare it to an apple, and we compare the Contact Group plan to a apple with a worm in it when we reject their intentions to take Sanski Most from us. The territories of Semberija and Posavina are the least destroyed. I am asking you as the assembly to state whether you support this letter, to give us new directions, or to appoint a new delegation, and finally determine who has the right in the name of

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the republic to establish contacts with foreigners regarding this conference. I can guarantee to you that not one American has been to see us without the approval of his government. They would not have dared come.

Gentlemen, various visits to President Milosevic not only did not benefit us but, on the contrary, the border became even tighter every time, and the impression has been created in the international public that we are about to fall. And what happens then? The Contact Group then delays the solution that was favorable to us. We have the formula. We know which formula should be accepted, and on what basis the talks can start. This formula has been pushed aside. They are waiting for us to give in.

Serbian Democratic Party deputy Andjelko Grahovac cannot defy the views of the party steering committee and give interviews in papers that then carry on their front pages that we can endure this for only two more months. Even if this were true, it would be a state secret. He should not be saying such things. This endangers the state, and we can endure longer. Look, we have not sold one company, we have not taken one single international loan. We have been fighting alone, at our own expense, for three years, and this is still the easiest Serb war ever fought. We have not concealed anything from our people. We have told them that they will have to shed blood, sweat, and tears to get and keep their state. We have been clear with the international community—We will not live in Bosnia-Herzegovina! We want you to recognize our state, and as for the territories, we are ready to haggle over those. Without a new referendum, we do not have the right to give up our state, to defy the will of the people, and become absorbed into the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The stories about a confederation are fairy tales for small children.

Gentlemen, things could become worse for us. We might all have to go to soup kitchens. We can lock up some of our companies, or all of them. Should we surrender, or should we lock up all our companies and go to soup kitchens and have one poor meal a day, but endure? Should we go across to our enemies, and soon fire bullets through our own heads? If anyone sees a third option, say it here. There is no third option. We have to endure. I think that we should leave this session with a clear policy on who conducts the policies of this state, and where it is leading. The international community must realize that we will not give in.

I will not elaborate here on what I think about the policy of conceding. That is a catastrophic policy that encourages those who hold pliers in their hands to squeeze us further. If the entire Serbian people were today to stand up and create a national state, it could win in six months, and the state would be recognized within a year. I am not a candidate for treason! I do not want to betray my people, and I do not believe that any of you wants to betray our people. We have been tricked into all sorts of contacts with the Contact Group, Messers Buha and Krajisnik here know that. We had initially refused to have contacts with the Contact Group—then later we accepted on advice from outside—since we knew then that the Contact Group was doing the same as Vance and Owen: Preparing an ultimatum.

The screenplay is well known: We have to say "yes," and then hold talks on the exchange of territories, which would be unsuccessful since we would not manage to exchange anything, and then we would have to withdraw to the lines to which we would have already agreed, and that is the end of the state. That would solve the issue of the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the issue of the recognition of the republic of Serbian Krajina, and of course we would emerge as the offenders that led to such a state of affairs, while everyone else would come out clean.

I want to say publicly what I said to our army when certain officers asked me what was to be done to improve relations. Gentlemen, they have shut down the last little hole along the Drina River through which something could have been sent to us. Our economy was enough to finance our war and to feed our people. They are suffocating that economy. They have deployed observers on their side. But we will forgive all that, and we are ready to improve our relations straight away. We are willing to kiss the boot, but show us the boot we should kiss [spremni smo da ljubimo papucu, samo da nam se pokaze koja je to papuca]. We will humiliate ourselves to prevent the humiliation of our people. We should be told what is expected from us in order to save the people. We will do this, whatever it takes. But one things we will not do! We will not sign something that brings shame to the Serbs, and we will not sign the end of Serbian dreams about one Serbian state or a community of Serbian states. We will not do this after the referendum, after this session. If the assembly makes a different decision, then it will have to find someone else to sign it.

Karadzic: War To End If Serbs Recognized

LD1502193395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1822 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Feb (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, said in Grahovo [western Bosnia] today that the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina will end when the international community decides to recognize the Srpska republic.

"This is the last truce that we will accept unless there is definite peace," Karadzic told the people of Grahovo and went on to say that the international community "has to use the [current] truce to establish permanent peace."

Karadzic pointed out that the Srpska republic wants the war to end without victors but that it will "defeat and completely crush the enemies if they resume attacks against its borders. All international power brokers are aware of what the Serbs can and cannot accept, and that

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is why they always come up with unacceptable proposals thus ensuring that the war goes on," Karadzic said.

Stressing that Muslims and Croats are responsible for the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina because they did not want to remain in Yugoslavia, Karadzic also blamed the European countries' foreign ministers and heads of state and government.

"They had been aware of what would happen here and now they refuse to let the conflict end in a just and honorable way. They are trying to set humiliating conditions for the victorious Serb people," Karadzic said in conclusion.

Serbs Threaten Action Against 'Mysterious' Planes

AU1502142295 Paris AFP in English 1408 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 15 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb authorities have threatened to take "appropriate action" to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia following sightings of mysterious planes flying over the northern town of Tuzla, UN officials said Wednesday [15 February].

"Following flights over and possibly into Tuzla area, the Bosnian Serbs have explained their position which is that that should not be happening as there is a no-fly zone," UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman Gary Coward said. "Should we be unable to control the no-fly zone, they implied they would take appropriate action." He did not say what the "appropriate action" may entail.

Last Friday and Sunday, UNPROFOR observers sighted a C-130 Hercules plane and several other smaller aircraft flying at low altitude over one of the runways at Tuzla airport, which has been shut down for nearly a year. The observers said the planes may have been transporting supplies for the mainly Muslim Bosnian Army stationed in the region.

The incident, however, remains a "mystery" for the time being, Coward said, adding that a NATO team visited the region Tuesday and was expected to render their conclusions on the matter.

The United Nations imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1992 and several nations, including France, the Netherlands and the United States, have been flying to enforce it since April 1993 as part of a NATO operation.

News Blackout by Serbs as Karadzic Issues Warning

AU1502214695 Paris AFP in English 2134 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 15 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic threatened to smash the Bosnian Government Army if it launched an offensive in the tinderbox Bihac pocket, the SRNA news agency said Wednesday [15 February].

Karadzic said his self-proclaimed Srpska republic hoped that the war would end "without a victor" but would "smash the enemy in case of a new offensive against its borders," in a speech to the people of Grahovo in western Bosnia, the agency said.

Karadzic's comments came after the Bosnian Serbs imposed a news blackout on their media concerning the military situation in the volatile Bihac pocket, scene of some of the worst fighting in recent months. Fighting has raged across the enclave since late last year, pitting Bosnian Government troops on one side agaisnt an alliance of Croatian and Bosnian Serbs and rebel Moslems.

"The press has been forbidden to detail information on the situation in the Bihac zone," a journalist from the Serb-controlled SRNA news agency told AFP. The agency's headquarters are in Pale, the self-declared republic's capital near Sarajevo. The move was interpreted as significant by the local Serb press, which believes "something serious is going on in the Bihac pocket," the journalist said.

Karadzic also said that the "the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina would end the day the international community recognises" the self-declared Srpska republic.

"All the actors of the international community know what the Serbs can and cannot accept," the Serb leader said, "and this is why they advance unacceptable propositions, which also ensure the continuation of the war." The Serbs have rejected a peace plan that would force them to give up about a third of the land they seized since the war broke out nearly three years ago.

"They refuse to end the conflict in a just and honorable manner and try to dictate humiliating conditions to the victorious Serb people," he said. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serbs Want Muslim Bihac Offensive Halted

LD1502201895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1822 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Feb (SRNA)—Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Srpska republic and chairman of the state committee for cooperation with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], and Enrique Aguillar, head of UNPROFOR's civilian department for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, agreed in Pale today that the resolution of the crisis in the Bihac area was the precondition for the continuation of the implementation of the agreement on the complete cessation of hostilities.

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"The Serb side has approved a new route for humanitarian convoys to Bihac, via Banja Luka and Petrovac. The world should know that the Serbs were not the ones who violated this agreement, but that the Muslim offensive of 11 January and 11-13 February prevented the passage of humanitarian aid.

"We are now suggesting that the Muslims halt their offensive and return to their positions of 1 January, after which the convoys would be free to pass, and we could even establish economic cooperation," Koljevic said after the meeting.

Recalling that the Muslim side had failed to show up at any of the meetings of the regional commission for the Bihac area in Ripac, and refused to attend the meeting of the central commission scheduled for today, Koljevic repeated that the Muslims were violating existing agreements to the detriment of a part of their own people. "UNPROFOR's commander for former Bosnia-Herzegovina General Rupert Smith will meet Muslim commander Rasim Delic today and try to persuade him to negotiate. The further resolution of civilian issues will be dependent on these talks. The Serb side will keep on trying to maintain its peaceful approach to resolving civilian problems," Koljevic concluded.

Aguillar said after the meeting that he was encouraged by the Serb authorities' permission to let UNPROFOR's convoys pass to Bihac via Banja Luka. "The implementation of this agreement is presently impossible due to the fighting in the area. The agreement on the cessation of hostilities has established a control mechanism known as the Central Mixed Commission and this problem should be solved at this level", Aguillar was adamant.

In addition to the Bihac problem, Vice President Koljevic and Aguillar discussed the implementation of the exchange of POWs, while a meeting devoted to the freedom to choose one's place of residence has been scheduled for Monday [20 February].

According to Aguillar, UNPROFOR's civilian department will soon be opening an office in Ilidza, charged with the task of working on the reconstruction of Serb Sarajevo.

Inter-Muslim Fighting in Western Bosnia Continues

LD1502204695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2033 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Petrovac, Feb. 15 (TANJUG)—Fierce inter-Muslim fighting in western Bosnia continued on Wednesday, local Radio Velkaton reported.

The radio controlled by president of the Muslim autonomous province of West Bosnia Fikret Abdic said provincial forces retook new territories and strategical peaks in fighting with troops of the Muslim Sarajevo government 5th Corps, thus consolidating their defense positions.

Radio Velkaton said the 5th Corps suffered serious losses and that large numbers of them were taken prisoner. The radio said the province's forces also suffered considerable losses.

TANJUG correspondents report that Muslim military formations are still violating the agreement on a four-month cessation of hostilities signed on Dec. 31 last year, attacking Serb positions and civilian targets throughout Bosnia.

From the direction of Konjic in southern Bosnia, Muslims attempted a mortar-backed infantry breakthrough on Bosnian Serb territory, but the attack was repelled after several hours of clashes.

The press office of the Bosnian Serb army 1st Krajina Corps said Muslim forces were attacking Serb positions and settlements in the wider area of Doboj in northern Bosnia. The Muslim army is hastily massing manpower and munitions on the lines of confrontation with the Serb side in that region, which is interpreted in Bosnian Serb military circles as preparations for a new offensive.

According to the Serb military command, the aim of the new Muslim offensive would be to link the Tuzla and Zenica basins in northeastern Bosnia.

Serb Attacks Reported 'Worst' in Velika Kladusa

AU1502204295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint aggressor did not stop attacking the UN-protected zone of the Bihac District today. Karadzic and Martic's chetniks have been constantly shelling defense lines and populated places. The situation is again at its worst in the Velika Kladusa region, where artillery and infantry assaults by Martic and Abdic's chetniks have been carried out in waves. Today their attacks were most intensive in the Podzviz region, where defenders have been subjected to fierce fire for days, but have heroically withstood all attacks and attempts at a breakthrough. Apart from this, all free regions in the Bosanska Krupa municipality are today the target of tank and artillery attacks and [word indistinct] from well-known chetnik strongholds above the city. The defenders' positions have also been a target for constant small arms fire.

In other sections of the theater of operations of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Headquarters of the Croatian Defense Council for the Bihac Region, the intensity of attacks has been somewhat lower, but the regrouping of chetnik forces and the massing of new military hardware in [word indistinct] around Bihac is still noticeable, although the chetniks are trying to disguise their activity with false fires in the parts of (Rivca) and Pritoka. Some similar activities of allegedly fleeing and torching everything in their wake

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were also noticed in the regions along the border with the so-called SAO [Serbian Autonomous Region] of Krajina.

[Words indistinct] during the chetnik offensive on Bihac, material damage of unforeseeable proportions was inflicted on the Bihac outskirts of Vedro Polje, Zegar, Zavalje, Skocaj, and Sokolac. (?In some) places, there are in fact no buildings that have not been ruined, burned down, or considerably damaged.

General Danger Alarm Sounded in Bihac

AU1502162895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] A general danger alarm was sounded in Bihac again around noon today because of the evermore pronounced and open amassing of chetnik units, particularly in the region of the so-called SAO [Serbian Autonomous Region] of Krajina and from the direction of Bosanski Petrovac. Artillery and tank attacks on defense lines and populated places in the Velika Kladusa region also continued throughout the afternoon, and Martic and Abdic's chetniks are still attempting infantry breakthroughs from several directions.

The chetniks are not giving up their artillery attacks on populated regions and defense lines on the Bosanska Krupa section of the front either. On other sections of the front, the theater of operations of the 5th Corps of the Army [words indistinct] Headquarters of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] of the Bihac Region, the chetniks have been intensively bringing in new forces, carrying out usual provocations with small arms, and shelling indiscriminately.

The humanitarian situation in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has exceeded a critical limit, was discussed again today with UN Protection Force and international organization representatives.

Muslim-Serb Clashes Registered in Northern Areas

LD1502172895 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1514 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Bileca, Doboj, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—Muslim military units have attempted to infiltrate Serb-held territory in the Herzegovina sector of the front and have attacked Serb positions and civilian targets in the Doboj region, TANJUG correspondents have reported, citing sources in the Srpska republic army.

According to the command of Serb units in Bileca, after mortar attacks Muslim infantry units attempted to penetrate the territory controlled by the Srpska republic forces from the direction of Konjic. After several hours of fighting, the attack was halted. One Muslim commando unit tried to infiltrate the Serb frontlines in the Cobanovo Polje area between Mostar and Nevesinje but was forced to flee.

Sporadic clashes resumed today in sections of the front between Mostar and Nevesinje. According to the same command, flights of helicopters carrying ammunition and weapons were registered in the "Muslim enclave of Gorazde" over the past few days.

The information service of the First Bosnian Serb Krajina corps says that Muslim forces have been attacking Serb positions and villages along the frontlines in the Doboj region.

'Enemy' Shells Srebrenica Protected Zone

AU1502173195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 95

[Report by Amra Durakovic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The demilitarized and protected zone of Srebrenica was today again [word indistinct] enemy artillery. Here is [name indistinct] reporting in detail about the events on this section of the Bosnia-Herzegovina front:

[Begin recording] From his stronghold at (Koprivno), the enemy fired five 82-mm mortar rounds at the region of Slatina and dropped one bomb on the village of Salkovci in the protected zone.

For your information, Karadzic's Serbs have lately been (?digging) a road from Derventa, Vlasenica Municipality, toward the Bandijera elevation, also in the protected zone. Therefore, not only has the promise that the chetniks will withdraw from the Bandijare elevation, which was given by General De Lapresle, commander of the peace forces for the former Yugoslavia, during his visit in Srebrenica, not been fulfilled, but the chetniks have in fact continued to strengthen their positions on the elevation and carry out armed provocations against the protected zone from it every day.

As I report, news has just arrived in the Srebrenica Press Center that a chetnik sniper from Bandijera has killed a civilian. [end recording]

The enemy continued to violate the signed cease-fire on the Sarajevo front as well. Targeted by his small arms were the regions of Bigusevac, Brekin Potok, and our defense positions. The aggressor's snipers were active today again: One person was wounded at Stupsko Brdo. [passage omitted]

Opposition Parties, TV Director Discuss Program

AU1502182595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting was held in (?Sarajevo) today between the management of the Radio and

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Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina and representatives of five opposition parliamentary parties: the Social Democratic Party, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social-Democrats, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the Republicans, and the Croatian Peasant Party, BH PRESS reports.

Amila Omersoftic, director of the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina, acquainted party representatives with the extremely grave situation in the largest information house in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The poor material, technological, and personnel situation, and the unfair competition staged by many independent information media are, above all, involved.

In a statement he made for BH PRESS after the meeting, Sejfudin Tokic, chairman of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social-Democrats, pointed out that the goal of the meeting was to establish methods and possibilities for the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina to really realize its role of presenting to the public the established state policy despite the many difficulties it is having. It was demanded that a program on political parties, such as exist at Croatian Television, be introduced into the seven-day program schedule. In this program, all parliamentary parties would be given an equal time to present their stands. It was also demanded that a program, a sort of television parliament, be introduced to enable viewers to see a polemical debate and thus be presented with different political views of the current situation.

More programs from [word indistinct] were also touched upon at today's meeting. One of the clearly expressed stands the representatives of the five opposition parties presented to the management of the Radio and Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina was to introduce promotional spots of all parliamentary parties or otherwise take the spot of the Party of Democratic Action off the program. The same demand would apply to the programs of the Radio of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Commentary Advocates Direct Talks With Milosevic

AU1602111795 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 12 Feb 95 p 1

[Commentary by Hamza Baksic: "Door and Window"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One can negotiate with Milosevic. As a matter of fact, Milosevic is the only one with whom one can negotiate: All this started in Belgrade, everything that has been going on has generally been backed by Serbia and everything that has yet to happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina largely depends on Serbia and Bosnia's ability to shed the true light on it.

Milosevic and Karadzic are advocates of the same policy, the icing on a century-and-a-half-old iceberg. If one can negotiate with Karadzic—as Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic has been saying—then why should one not negotiate with Milosevic? Neither Karadzic nor Milosevic recognize the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the time being and for obvious reasons neither is showing any intention of recognizing it. On the other hand, recognition itself—as has been argued by this paper before—is not the door to life in heaven or at least life without war. The proof for that is the recognition that this republic got from Zagreb, which has had the same weight as, for example, the agreements signed in August.

The alternative to direct negotiations are indirect negotiations, along the lines of separate rooms. This is a specific method used by international diplomacy, the quality of which can be best illustrated by the fact that it was mostly used during the breakup of Yugoslavia, when diplomats dashed from one room to another down the corridors of the Federal Palace while post-Yugoslav wars raged.

The main feature of indirect negotiations is that one hands over one's destiny to mediators. The mediators become omnipotent, they can pass on views fully or partially, they can be inclined toward one side or the other, but are always inclined toward themselves since they are trying to work out any kind of a deal to save the reputation—and interests—of the international community.

Slobodan Milosevic is interested in a tripartite meeting. First because the international community thus promotes him again to being the leader of all Serbs and anything less than that is insufficient for Milosevic. Second, both Milosevic and Serbia find themselves at an important crossroads. The economic crisis has reached the point at which the final decision has to be made—to opt for either the economy or a complete militarization of society.

There are assessments that the war, if it continues, could go on for another two to three years. This is probably an optimistic version. Wars cannot be portioned or deadlined. They have their own secret laws that are incomprehensible to the participants.

Direct negotiations with Belgrade—in the optimistic version—could reduce the danger of a long war, a war to extermination, although there are no clear signs that any spectacular solution could be reached. However, if the road to a solution leads to Belgrade, then one should enter through the front door and not through the Pale window.

Article Views Recent Debate on Religion in Army

AU1602105395 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 95 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Ideologization or Religious Inspiration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The public polemics about the "ideologization and religious instrumentalization" of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in which all the members

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of the Presidency of the Republic and most of the political parties participated, ended last week with the compromise announcement by the Presidency, saying that "it is neither a personal conflict nor a struggle for power."

In this announcement, the Presidency did not express its position on the main topic of the polemics, but rather opted for the political platform of its future activity. It expressed complete political unity in relation to the fundamental issues of the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the struggle for its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and its democratic and civic character. Full support was expressed for the liberation fight and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, as well as for the orientation toward establishing a just peace, thus rejecting all the related speculations as malevolent and without any basis....

A Matter of Principle or the Exchange of These

Preceding this Presidency appearance, there was a stormy public debate regarding the announcement by five members of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dr. Nijaz Durakovic, Stjepan Kljuic, Dr. Ivo Komsic, Dr. Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic, and Dr. Mirko Pejanovic), in which they expressed their disagreement with the observed ideologization and negative instrumentalization of religion in some of the formations of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The five Presidency members claimed the following: "This process is taking place without our knowledge and despite our warnings. We remain at the position that the army that defends, and that will continue to defend, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be secular and multinational, beyond the influence of political parties...."

Many reactions followed. First, the two "remaining" members of the Presidency—President Izetbegovic and Dr. Ejup Ganic reacted. In their announcement, they claimed that the statement of the five Presidency members was unfounded, and that it was based on the exchange of theses: It was not an issue of ideologization and instrumentalization, but of the manifestation of faith.

"...The units at which the signatories of the statement were evidently aiming have defended—sometimes with great sacrifices and casualties—many villages and towns, and saved the people from genocide, while never carrying out genocide themselves. Their religious inspiration was no object—it helped them protect the weak, their lives, their honor, and their property, not asking for their names. After all, their slogan, that only God is great, is the source of their courage and the power to face the dangers of this long and difficult struggle. We do not know why such messages could bother anyone if the aims of the fighting are clear and indisputable...." They claimed: The goal of the fighting of all the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is the integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the integral Bosnia is a democratic and free state.

The Role of the Headquarters

After that, the Headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a statement signed by the commanding staff and commanders of corps. The statement said: "The Headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the corps commanders, the commands, and the units of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army fully support the joint announcement of the president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, and Dr. Ejup Ganic. The Army Headquarters believes that manifestations of faith in the Army are free, and that they represent no ideologization or instrumentalization in the Army. The goal of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army remains clear and is in accordance with the positions of the political authority of the country."

The next move was made by the opposition. The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, the Muslim Bosniak Organization, the Croatian Peasants' Party, and the Republican Party issued a public statement saying: "...Considering the fact that we support the legal division of authority between the civilian and military bodies in political and state life, we consider the Headquarters staff statement a precedent and a politically harmful act. In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is inappropriate that the Headquarters should meddle in the expressly political issues that are under the jurisdiction of the civilian authorities, in this case the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Headquarters staff has neither the political authority nor the legal right to arbitrate in internal political relations in the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the supreme command of the armed forces. The Headquarters staff has even less right to take political orientations and to favor certain positions or political orientations that are under the jurisdiction of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina...."

Readers' reactions "for" and "against" appeared in the media. It seemed that the issue was a disunion in the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was threatening with disunion in other bodies of authority, including the Army itself. The Presidency held a session, and, as we said at the beginning of this text, it told the public that there was no disunion and that public polemics on the problems of the Army, even though this one was a sign of democracy and pluralism in our society, should in the future THIS institutions of the system, where they belong.

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UNPROFOR To Destroy Explosives

AU1602115295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 16 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sarajevo section of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] has announced that today and tomorrow afternoon it will be destroying unexploded mines and other explosive materials on the Sarajevo front. According to the same source, the largest amounts of explosives so far are to be destroyed and most of this will take place on Hum Hill.

UNPROFOR is calling on the citizens of Sarajevo to remain calm when they hear the explosions, which will be very loud. The destruction of these unexploded materials by the United Nations is in accordance with the agreement on the cessation of hostilities that was signed at the end of last year.

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Martic: 'No Chance' FRY To Recognize Croatia

AU1502171095 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by S. Pokrajac-Stamatovic: "Against Ripping the Heavens and Sanctions on Earth"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Top representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Serbia will honor the obligation set out by the Vance plan to protect the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] in the event of the peace forces leaving and Croatia attacking. This is what Milan Martic, president of the RSK yesterday told a press conference in the packed International Press Center in Belgrade in response to the question of whether the RSK has the Serbian president's guarantee regarding military aid. Stressing that he did not wish to mention names, Martic said that he had had several talks with the leaderships of Serbia and the FRY, which were "concrete regarding the FRY's honoring obligations in accordance with the Vance plan," and that this obligation also exists on paper. Martic refused to comment on Borisav Jovic's recent statement that the FRY is not obliged to aid the Krajina militarily if it is attacked, and called it "counterproductive." There is no chance that a single politician in Serbia or the FRY would recognize Croatia in its AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders.

Martic assessed the Serbian president's decision not to mediate in negotiations between Knin and Zagreb as "correct," and stressed that "President Milosevic said several times that we should solve problems between Krajina and Croatia ourselves." The Russian diplomacy's appeal to the Serbian president to recognize Croatia in its AVNOJ borders was assessed by the Krajina president as being "a wrong step." The Russian diplomacy is trying to protect itself, but it is doing so in the wrong way. There was a time when Russian diplomacy could have been a power had it vetoed the sanctions against Yugoslavia, Martic said and added that "what the world did to Yugoslavia is today happening in Chechnya according to the same principle."

Danger of War Threats

Reiterating that the RSK had not even considered the "Z-4" plan drawn up by the mini Contact Group, and that it was unaware of what it proposed, Martic assessed that not a single plan "has any chances of success if the peace forces do not stay on after 31 March. We do not agree with changing the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate, and Croatia cannot be the only one to decide on this, because in addition to Croatia, the RSK and the FRY also decided on it when they accepted the Vance plan. Its key point," stressed Martic, "is that the presence of the peace forces cannot prejudge a political solution and that they would stay until a political solution is found, but through peaceful means."

What will happen if UNPROFOR leaves in spite of everything? This is how president of the RSK answered this question:

"We shall not deter them, nor will we create problems. We wish to show the world that peace is our option, and the only way is for the peace forces to stay. If the world wants peace, it will make an effort in keeping UNPROFOR in place. If they fail to do so, the war could escalate dangerously and spread outside the current crisis area, and no one would be able to control it. We want peace, but if war is forced on us, we shall defend ourselves not only defensively, but also offensively. You must not forget that the Serbs are one people in the region of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and as such will always show solidarity, regardless of where they live, and they will defend themselves in all regions."

Responding to the question of whether UNPROFOR's withdrawal would mean the complete breakdown of all negotiations between the RSK and Croatia, Martic said that the peace forces role hitherto had been immense and that he did not believe that any progress in negotiations would have been achieved if it had not been for UNPROFOR. "There was a time when we were angry at them, both we and the Croats, by generally speaking, the peace forces have done a good job so far. I am not optimistic that we shall be able to agree on anything with Croatia without the presence of the peace forces, because the Croats do not treat us a sovereign state—which we are—but as an occupying force," Martic said. He particularly stressed that Croatia made the decision "prompted by its permanent sponsor Germany, counting on the fact the UN Security Council would pressure the FRY to recognize Croatia in its AVNOJ borders."

Croatia Is Also Not Calm

In Martic's opinion, Tudjman was forced to take this decision by Croatia's great inner instability and political conflicts within the Croatian Sabor. "However, not all Croatian regions advocate war with us. This was recently clearly implied. All of Istria does not want a war with the RSK, and neither does Dalmatia," the Krajina president said.

Martic also recalled the Srpska republic's obligation to honor the Prijedor Declaration, which specifies mutual military assistance between the Srpska republic and the RSK. He also stressed that such military cooperation already exists and should not be hidden since "we are one people." He denied that Udbina airfield was being used for bombing Muslim positions in the Bihac area, and stressed that rumors of a sale of territories were just "pure speculation." Asked why Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, no longer addressed press conferences in the International Press Center, Martic answered that this question should be addressed to others rather than himself.

Martic commented on the imminent arrival of Croatian Minister Mate Granic on a visit to the FRY, saying that it was "a return visit to see Minister Jovanovic." "I have nothing against relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia, but the issue of Krajina cannot be solved

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without the Krajina state leadership." Answering the question of why he had written to Giancarlo Fini, "leader of a fascist party in Italy," Martic retorted that he treats all parties equally, and that Fini represents a great number of people in Italy, has great power, and is willing to recognize Krajina.

The president of the RSK particularly stressed that the Krajina had entered its fifth year and that "factual, legal, and historical facts are on our side, hence we are not afraid of negotiations."

We are proposing negotiations with Croatia, but exclusively on an equal basis and with international mediation, said Milan Martic.

Martic on UN Withdrawal: 'Croatia Will Burn'

BR1302132595 Madrid ABC in Spanish 13 Feb 95 p 36

[Interview with Milan Martic, republic of Serb Krajina president, by Simon Tecco in Knin; date not given: "Milan Martic: 'Croatia Will Burn If Blue Helmets Withdraw From Krajina'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin—The Zagreb government's decision not to renew the mandate of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and demand the blue helmets' withdrawal from the territories occupied by the Krajina Serbs has again caused an increase in tension on the demarcation line between Krajinans and Croats. Armed incidents are increasing, and Serb Milan Martic did not hesitate to tell ABC: "There will be war if the blue helmets withdraw from Krajina."

The Serb leaders are categorically opposed to UNPROFOR's departure from Krajina, as is the international community; the former because this will mean opting for reintegration into Croatia or for war at a certain stage in the negotiations, and the latter because it especially fears the latter, which would set the region alight again.

After Croat President Franjo Tudjman confirmed Friday for the umpteenth time that this decision will not be reconsidered, ABC decided to hear the opposing side's opinion.

Asked about the reasons which, in his opinion, prompted Zagreb's decision, Milan Martic, president of the self-declared republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] in the occupied Croat territories, replied categorically that "it is a consequence of Germany's support." The goal is for Yugoslavia to be pressed to the utmost until 31 March through the UN Security Council to recognize Croatia within its internationally confirmed borders. With this they would succeed in discontinuing all Belgrade's aid, including humanitarian aid, and creating an untenable economic situation in Krajina. The decision is also due to Croatia's internal problems. Tudjman is seeking through this to silence the strong criticism of the opposition, which is in favor of war.

"We Are Right"

[Tecco] What is Krajina's stance?

[Martic] Krajina has opted for peace, and we wish to resolve the conflict by political means. If the world examined our arguments, it would see that we are right. Any negotiation should be conducted while bearing in mind that it involves two sides with equal sovereign rights, and that the crisis should not be regarded as a Croat internal matter, because it cannot be that. What the world forgets is that, before Yugoslavia's disintegration, the Serb nation was a constituent part of that state.

[Tecco] How do you interpret President Tudjman's statement asserting that Zagreb is not agreeing to renew UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate in order to be able to "accelerate the peaceful resolution" of the conflict, but that it does not rule out the possibility of armed incidents occurring?

"Tudjman Has Opted for War"

[Martic] He cannot state anything else, because he cannot say that this means declaring war on the RSK. But the chosen formula is in line with the absolute decision of opting for war, since we can see no way to find a peaceful solution if the peacekeeping forces do not take part in the negotiating process.

[Tecco] The Croat president maintains that he would accept the possibility of Croatia's borders being monitored by international observers or a limited number of NATO forces...

"Croatia Will Burn"

[Martic] The Vance Plan envisages the peacekeeping forces remaining in this territory until a political solution is achieved, and we naturally do not accept changing that mandate. We cannot accept the possibilities which Tudjman offers us, nor can he force us to accept them. There is a 99 percent chance that another war will occur if UNPROFOR withdraws. Let Tudjman not believe that if he attacks us, we will not respond. In that event, Croatia will burn, and I do not believe that the United Nations would accept this. I have realized that Tudjman's intentions are for Germany to reimpose its influence in these areas and, of course, the other NATO members, too. In this way, they could finish what he began and his forces cannot carry out.

[Tecco] Does your government have an alternative proposal? With respect to the summit of the presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia proposed by France, are you afraid that Krajina's fate may be decided between Zagreb and Belgrade, and not between Zagreb and Knin?

We Alone Will Decide

[Martic] We have proposed that when this third stage in the negotiation is reached, a place be found for us within the peace conference for former Yugoslavia, but as parties with equal rights. The least that we will accept is

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for the population to be allowed at some point to decide how and with whom they will live; that is, whether they wish to live in an independent Serb state, become integrated into the other Serb states, or live in Croatia. I personally will never accept living in the Croat state, but it is the nation which must decide in a referendum under international supervision.

Moreover, Juppe's intention is clear. The aim of the proposal that Tudjman represent Croatia, Milosevic the Serbs, and Izetbegovic Bosnia-Herzegovina, is to exclude the Serbs of Krajina and Bosnia, and, second, to force Milosevic to recognize Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We do not doubt President Milosevic's good intentions, but we alone will decide on our fate. [answer ends]

Following the meeting, I heard the latest radio newscast: Croat Armed Forces Chief of Staff Janko Bobetko has just warned the Krajina Serbs not to resist the decided reintegration under Croat sovereignty...

RSK Army Warns Croats Against Military Attack

LD1502163695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1538 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—If the Army of Croatia launches an attack against the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], the Slavonia-Baranja Corps will mount an offensive along the entire front under its control, the commander of that unit, Major General Dusan Loncar, said in Vukovar today.

Loncar said at a news conference that intense combat preparations by the Army of Croatia have been registered over the past few days in the zone controlled by the corps. He also said that soldiers of the Osijek operational zone are carrying out reconnaissance missions.

According to Loncar, the latest example for such activities has been registered in Baranja where one Croatian army reconnaissance unit was eliminated.

Loncar pointed out that immediately after the decision of the Croatian authorities to terminate the mandate of the peacekeeping troops, tens of thousands of men from all Serb lands volunteered to join the corps.

Deputy Defense Minister: 'Peaceful' Reintegration

AU1502172895 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 95 p 6

[Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Josip Juras by Linda Milisa in Sibenik; date not given: "Time of Resolution Has Started"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia is sufficiently powerful to recapture all the occupied territories, deploy its army and police on the state and internationally recognized borders, and return exiled persons to their homes, Deputy Defense Minister Josip Juras said in his speech in Sibenik on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of country's Croatia Democratic Party. During his stay in Sibenik, we asked him for a brief interview.

[Milisa] Following Croatia's decision to cancel the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate, the self-proclaimed Knin leaders have proclaimed a state of a direct danger of war and frozen the talks on economic relations. Under the banner of being threatened by "the new Croatian aggression," Knin and Pale have been informing Zagreb in unison that, in the case of war, they will fight with a joint army of the rebel Croatian and Bosnian Serbs. How do you comment on this, and do you believe that a war will be inevitable after UNPROFOR's departure?

[Juras] We must understand that this is no longer 1990, 1991, or 1992. In these years, Croatia has strengthened militarily and, at the moment, our strength is such that it is ready to reintegrate the occupied territories into the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia. However, I must emphasize that we neither want nor think that a war will take place, but, as the Croatian Army, we must be ready. I am convinced that reason will prevail with the other side, that Serbian President Milosevic will finally recognize Croatia, which is a precondition for the resolution of the situation on the occupied territories. Despite numerous international factors, and even our international friends who are trying to convince us that the decision to turn out UNPROFOR was hasty, we maintain that it was not, because UNPROFOR did not fulfill the task that the UN Security Council set it in the form of numerous resolutions. Turning out UNPROFOR does not mean a proclamation of war, and I maintain that the war will not happen, that the reintegration will be carried out in a peaceful manner. It has all started with the highway and the oil pipe. I am convinced that the railway traffic toward Split, that is Sibenik and Zadar, will function, too, and, I believe, a road via Plitvice will also open.

Status Quo Does Not Suit Us

[Milisa] However, Knin is telling us that everything stated above can only be realized if UNPROFOR remains on the territories controlled by the rebel Serbs?

[Juras] Now, our position is very clear. UNPROFOR no longer has any business on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. In each of its earlier mandates, it proved itself to be ineffective, and the Serbs continued the genocide against the Croatian people despite their presence. The status quo definitely does not suit any Croatian citizen.

[Milisa] Is there a fear that the Serbs might perhaps instigate an attack after 31 March with which they would "in practice" demonstrated to the world "how they are being endangered"?

[Juras] I believe that there is no reason for concern; I shall say it once again; this is not 1990 or 1991, when all we had was the firm and unswayable will of the Croatian nation. This is 1995. At the military maneuvers that we

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held, the international observers had an opportunity to asses the military arsenal at our disposal. However, we do not wish to push this to the forefront, it is our determination to return all occupied territories within our constitutional order that is at the forefront.

We Will Continue Talks

[Milisa] How do you comment on the assessments of numerous international experts that a conflict is inevitable with UNPROFOR's departure and that it will spread all over the Balkans. Even the press has reported that Member of Parliament Aralica had said that the Z-4 plan was the match that will set the entire Balkans alight?

[Juras] I do not agree with these assessments. Croatia will negotiate about the Z-4 plan, however, about those points with which we do not agree, which do not suit Croatia. It is up to us, the high state officials, to negotiate and persist in the negotiations because it is definitely in our interest to achieve the reintegration in a peaceful way.

[Milisa] Will 1995 be the year of a solution; will the exiled persons finally return to their homes this year?

[Juras] This is hard to say precisely at this moment, however, one thing is clear—the time of resolution has started.

Babic Discusses UN Mandate, RSK Sovereignty

AU1402122995 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 95 pp 20-22

[Interview with Milan Babic, foreign affairs minister of the republic of Serbian Krajina, by Filip Svarm; place and date not given: "The Krajina Serbs Do Not Want Counties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Milan Babic gave an interview to VREME on 27 January. The long-awaited plan of the Z-4 group for the settlement of Krajina-Croatian relations was not yet known, so we were not able to discuss it with Babic. The Krajina minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of Krajina (the strongest party in the assembly of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK]) is one of the most competent people to discuss the political position, interests and internal differences among the local Serbs, but also their relations with the international community, Croatia and Serbia. There are at least two reasons for that. The first is that Babic is the first Serbian politician from the other side of the Drina ever to have confronted President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic, and who is, in the opinion of many, an extremely tough negotiator and one of the most uncompromising supporters of Krajina's statehood. The other reason is the estimates that the final solution of the Serbian-Croatian relations ought not to be delayed.

[Svarm] Mr. Babic, how do you assess the decision of the Republic of Croatia not to extend UNPROFOR's mandate?

[Babic] For us that move has not come unexpectedly. As early as last fall Croatia and [President] Tudjman himself were inclined to oppose the extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR in the RSK. However, their friends in the world advised them not to do so at the time.

The revocation of UNPROFOR's mandate has an internal-political dimension regarding relations in Croatia itself. The second dimension is Tudjman's estimate that, with regard to international relations and the circumstances that the RSK, the Srpska republic [RS], and FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] happen to be in, now is a good time for starting a diplomatic offensive to settle the question of Krajina in the way that suits him. In my opinion, those two dimensions have coincided.

The entire world, at least all those interested in settling the Yugoslav crisis, has shown its concern about or disagreement with Tudjman's decision.

From our point of view, it is not logical that the UN Security Council should consider Croatia's unilateral demand for the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate in UN Protected Areas [UNPA]. The United Nations deployed the peacekeeping forces in the SFRY following the demand by the government of the former SFRY. The parties that agreed on UNPROFOR's deployment were, in addition to Yugoslavia, the RSK, the Republic of Croatia and the RS, and also, as a party concerned, the representatives of the Serbs from the then Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the RS. Thus, following the logic of their deployment, the current unilateral demand of Croatia for the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate could not be implemented. However, since the time when the decision on UNPROFOR's deployment was made, some big changes have occurred. The Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] left the RSK, that is, the UNPA, which means that by that act the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] also left that region. After the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces the FRY was proclaimed only in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro. Croatia became internationally recognized and became a member-state of the United Nations, while the RSK was established de facto and now functions as a state.

The mandate of the peacekeeping forces in 1992 was not completely in agreement with the interests and consent of the RSK people. The entire public knows that at the time some big political splits occurred in Krajina, and that the intervention by the leadership of the Republic of Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia resulted in the illegal shift of the RSK leadership, in order to make possible the deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces. At the time the RSK assembly had many severe debates and experienced many tremors, but exclusively because of the demand, and above all because of the promise made by the leadership of Serbia and rump Yugoslavia that the RSK territory would be protected and that Yugoslavia and Serbia would guarantee peace in any conditions (either in the case of UNPROFOR's departure or of

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possible troubles due to which its mandate would be terminated before a final political settlement for RSK is found), the mandate was accepted. Therefore we consider Croatia's unilateral demand for UNPROFOR's departure to be insufficient reason for the Security Council to terminate it. Even in the Vance plan, as a positive clause, it is said that the peacekeeping forces will be deployed in UNPA until a political solution is found for them. However, these days, in addition to concern and disapproval, it appears that the world is becoming reconciled to the Croatian demand.

[Svarm] Does that mean that the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia is possible?

[Babic] According to the decision made by the UN Security Council regarding the extension of the mandate from September last year, UNPROFOR has a mandate to stay until 31 March. Even in 1992 we were pointing out that for us such a way of extending UNPROFOR's mandate is unfavorable and uncertain. In order for UNPROFOR to deploy its troops in the RSK it was necessary to have the consent of all the member-states of the UN Security Council and the majority of other UN member-states, while in order to terminate the mandate it is enough that only one member-state puts a veto on it. I hope that the Security Council will assess favorably the role of and results achieved by the peacekeeping forces as well as the possible consequences of their withdrawal, so that it will not make such a decision.

At the very beginning I interceded for the correction of certain clauses of the Vance plan. I demanded, first, that the clause stipulating UNPROFOR's deployment for only six months be corrected, and that the decision be made for its permanent deployment until a political solution is found, as well as that UNPROFOR be deployed along the demarcation line. By the subsequent decisions of the Security Council this demand regarding the demarcation line has been fulfilled: By the agreement on a cease-fire between Krajina and Croatia the establishment of a buffer-zone has been accepted. Which means that in such a way the Vance plan has been corrected precisely in accordance with the objections we were making ever since the beginning. We also objected to the JNA's withdrawal from Krajina because we considered that in such a way Yugoslavia was also withdrawing, that it was disappearing from the territory of the Serbian Republic, while we were also against the dissolution of our Territorial Defense, because UNPROFOR did not give us a full guarantee that it would protect us. Unfortunately, we proved to be right in two cases: In the case of the Croatian raid against Ravni Kotari and Lika, UNPROFOR did not react even though a UNPA was attacked.

Our basic political objection to the Vance plan was that the UNPA were treated as some regions of Croatia. However, both Serbia and Yugoslavia convinced us that those regions were defined as a part of Croatia in terms of Croatia being a federal unit of Yugoslavia, rather than its being an independent state.

[Svarm] Why did the government of Serbia and the rump Presidency of Yugoslavia insist on the acceptance of such a mandate for UNPROFOR despite your objections?

[Babic] Their explanation was that in such a way the Serbs will be protected. They wanted Yugoslavia out of the conflict. The Republic of Serbia, which, as we all very well know, led the policy of rump Yugoslavia, wanted to shift the responsibilities it had toward the Serbian people in Krajina and its territory as a part of Yugoslavia on to somebody else.

[Svarm] Many people fear that the war may flare up again if the UNPROFOR withdraws....

[Babic] Croatia is clearly showing its intentions to reintegrate the RSK, as they put it, into the legal, economic and political system of Croatia, either peacefully or forcefully. My opinion is that Croatia is demanding the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate in order to interrupt the continuity of the peace process in former Yugoslavia. Therefore the Croats are trying to reformulate the UNPROFOR mandate so as to deploy observers that would monitor the implementation of a political agreement by which Krajina (as Croats think) would agree to be an integral part of Croatia. If this does not happen, Croatia intends to take the territory of RSK by force. Quite certainly, the state bodies and the people of RSK will not accept the political solution proposed by Croatia—that the territory of Krajina should be an autonomous unit or two such units, for instance, counties or Croatian provinces.

[Svarm] There are opinions that according to the Vance plan the FRY is bound to intervene militarily if the existence of Krajina happens to be endangered. No Serbian or Yugoslav officials have mentioned anything like that in the recent time....

[Babic] For me, personally, the weak reaction from Yugoslavia and Serbia to the Croatian demand has been a great disappointment. If more explicit support and determination to fulfill the obligations regarding the protection of the territory of the RSK or extension of the mandate to UNPROFOR fail to come, that will mean that the leaderships of Serbia and Yugoslavia have seriously deceived the Serbian people in Krajina. That people was and still is the victim of all the turmoil and crises brought about by the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

[Svarm] How do you view the fact that, despite Zagreb's demand for UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the negotiations on economic issues and reestablishment of links with Croatia are advancing quite well?

[Babic] We have started economic negotiations with Croatia, that is, negotiations on economic and business issues in which we are mutually interested. We believe that in this way, if Croatia agrees, we shall be able to accomplish an economic model that will show that the interethnic conflict or war is unnecessary, and that the

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interests and existential questions of all the citizens in RSK and Croatia could be met. Also, we wanted to exert influence, if we can, on the remaining part of former Yugoslavia, to live normally, to manufacture, to exchange and show that everyone's interests can be met without conflicts. I was really satisfied with the way in which the negotiations began and with the Croatian side's reaction regarding the issues, showing interest in accomplishing this. However, ever since the agreement was signed, there have been political provocations and danger that the agreement might not be implemented because of their [Croatian] statements that it is all about the reintegration of RSK in Croatia, as opposed to our assessments and interests that it is all about cooperation with Croatia, as well as with the Srpska republic and the FRY. Actually, they wanted to reintegrate us into the economic sphere of Croatia, while on the other hand closing the borders toward the Srpska republic and the FRY. They have been quite successful in their attempts recently, thanks to the international community, which poses a great problem for the continuation of the negotiating process and the implementation of what we have already agreed upon—I refer to traffic and the oil pipeline—particularly because they want UNPROFOR to leave, although UNPROFOR is itself a guarantee for the functioning of the agreement.

[Svarm] In Knin you negotiated with the Croatian delegation, but you did not go to Zagreb to take part in the subsequent negotiating rounds. Why?

[Babic] Because of the constant Croatian politicization and attempts to represent everything as a process of consolidation with Croatia. They came to Knin once, while they actually wanted all the negotiations between Krajina and Croatia to take place in Zagreb.

[Svarm] Are there any disagreements regarding the negotiating process between you and [RSK] prime minister Borislav Mikelic?

[Babic] I do not know whether I could call it a disagreement, but I have insisted that we should reconsider the continuation of the negotiations in conditions when Croatia is demanding the departure of UNPROFOR and when it is not known whether the UN Security Council will make a decision that it should stay. Without UNPROFOR it will hardly be possible to implement everything that has been achieved in the current negotiations. However, at the moment I do not want my opinions to block the work of the government.

The government has been unanimous regarding the course of the negotiations so far. I expect a serious debate through which the government's attitude will be crystallized. Many members of the government look distrustfully upon the continuation of the negotiations with Croatia, but if the government fails to take a definite stance through a consensus, the assembly will certainly do so.

[Svarm] You went to Pale with RSK President Milan Martic. At the same time Prime Minister Mikelic met with Lord David Owen, cochairman of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia. What was discussed at those two meetings?

[Babic] I think that Prime Minister Mikelic has been asked to go a step further than what has been agreed so far and what the government has established as its platform for negotiations. He discussed those matters with Lord Owen, as well as some other issues that are to be negotiated with Croatia.

As for the meeting in Pale, the initial plan was that all of us go there. However, Mikelic remained in Belgrade, so the chairman of the assembly, the president of the republic and I paid a visit to the leadership of the Srpska republic. We were informed on the peace process that they are engaged in and we exchanged experiences, since they have mostly been negotiating political issues while we have been absorbed in economic issues. We discussed the possibility of joint actions in the forthcoming period.

[Svarm] Did you agree on military cooperation?

[Babic] Military cooperation had been planned in detail even earlier, on the basis of the declaration signed in Prijedor and joint decisions made by the assemblies of the RSK and the Srpska republic, so that was one of the issues we discussed on that occasion as well.

The basic political resolve of the Srpska republic, as was confirmed even at that meeting, is the unification of all the Serbian states into one state. This is also our basic political resolve. Following my and the Krajina SDS' initiative, the government and assembly of Krajina have endorsed a project on unification where one of the options is that, if the unification with the FRY does not take place, the RSK and the Srpska republic will look for an optimal formula of mutual integration until the unification into a unitary state, depending on time and future circumstances.

[Svarm] So you are excluding any possibility of federal or confederal association with Croatia, are you?

[Babic] Sovereign states may associate by mutual agreement into a confederation, while the federal state is something else. The RSK is a sovereign state.

[Svarm] Have there been any divisions in the political structures of Krajina after the conflict between Belgrade and Pale?

[Babic] There are persons who are frequently in one place, while seldom in the other place who are by their political convictions closer to one or the other part of the Serbian space. But there is no polarization. The current government of the RSK is essentially a coalition government. The SDS of Krajina has seven portfolios in the government out of 18, the SDS of the Serbian states has two, while the rest belongs to a group that is close to prime minister Mikelic. Although it does not explicitly show that, the group shares his political convictions. With regard to this fact one can view the government's

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approach to certain Serbian centers. So far the government has achieved consensus regarding crucial questions. We have been making efforts to maintain good relations with both the Srpska republic and the FRY, regardless of the difficult relations among the Serbian states that have not been known before. I think that such a situation should not have occurred, because it harms Serbia as well as the Srpska republic and the RSK, which is not directly involved in the conflict, but is indirectly affected in the political and economic sphere.

[Svarm] Is Krajina under an economic blockade as well, and who determines the extent of the blockade?

[Babic] All the goods intended for the RSK have been blocked at the border crossing near Sremska Raca. The extent of the blockade is determined by the cochairmen of the Conference on former Yugoslavia, that is, by the international community as well as the administration that controls the border. However, the public and the government of RSK are not sufficiently informed on how some of the goods for Krajina are transported on the highway through Croatia. Prime minister Mikelic sends a list of goods through Geneva to Croatian negotiator Hrvoje Sarinic. He informs the Croatian police and those trucks are allowed on the highway. This has been going on for several days already, or more precisely, since the Mikelic's meeting with Lord Owen. It is no great quantity of goods, and is actually considerably below the level of Krajina's needs. Nothing is allowed to pass through the corridor any more. With such practices we do not help ourselves much, while we indirectly harm others. This is happening without sufficient knowledge on the part of the government and the public.

The Serbian leadership is showing great interest in helping us economically. However, as you see, Resolution 920 is being implemented without our consent. We are affected by it much more than Serbia, so it does not need to shout louder than we do.

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Unequal Military Ties to U.S. Viewed

AU1502204595 Skopje PULS in Macedonian
10 Feb 95 pp 12-13

[Commentary by Todor Atanasovski: "Protection Does Not Mean Defense"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I have stated my opinion on our strategic determination to "rely on the collective system of international security" several times. This reliance is seen as one of the "three cornerstones" of our defense strategy, in addition to the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] Army and the Civil Defense. On one occasion (DEMOKRATIJA of 27 Dec 1994), I analyzed the characteristics of this system in the time of great changes and after the destruction of the bipolar environment, with an assessment that this security system is undergoing great transformation and that it is very vulnerable and at the mercy of the most powerful nations that are outside the organization of the United Nations. Although a whole range of problems burdens this system, our strategy has long opted for the most important problems and questions in the area of military policy and defense of the country. This strategy has more or less expressed itself as a formed system of positions and views on which our defense policy will be based at home and in foreign relations.

The Republic of Macedonia has based its security on this system, actively including itself—within its possibilities—in the peaceful activities and in the most appropriate manner, particularly in the preventive antiwar activities of the United Nations. With its policy of positive equidistance, Macedonia has already achieved good results and our strategy has demonstrated itself to be on a high level of reasoning and state maturity. This position enabled us to neutralize the possibilities for spreading war in the Balkans.

Macedonia as a state has decisively accepted the European option, its philosophy and policy, the concept of "Partnership for Peace." Macedonia wants to be accepted into NATO because it is aware of NATO's exclusive role in the international security system. This proves that Macedonia has its own strategy and that it is functioning well on several positions, which creates conditions for it to be adequately treated in and through international relations. Our strategy is somewhat less complete when internal determinants are at stake. However, we shall not speak about this aspect of our defense at this time. Normally, this aspect is of no smaller importance, and the fact that it has not been fully completed can in certain circumstances diminish the effects of its activities on the international plan.

When we speak about the relationship among the antagonistic and mutually opposing strategies it seems that there are not many unknown aspects. They mutually deny each other and they are using all available means in the struggle for their own interests and goals. We shall review the mutual relationship of strategies that are not in conflict and hostile, and that share the same interests and goals. We shall restrict the discussion because we shall only speak about the interstrategic relations between the United States and the Republic of Macedonia. A broader analysis can discover other coincidences from other positions.

It is a fact that the U.S. and the Macedonian strategies are not of the same value. This relationship is relative and limited in terms of Macedonia's possibilities and interest, and therefore the two sides cannot express themselves in the same way. The possibilities, the abilities, and the goals of the U.S. strategy are of global importance, which means that their mutual relationship is created on a particular point, in a limited time and conditions, and in an appropriate way. In this relationship Macedonia participates with all its capacities, while the United States is using only a part of its abilities and capacities. We can therefore not speak of a balanced and equal interstrategic relationship. Macedonia is first of all interested in avoiding war and in maintaining its independence, and therefore it accepts this interstrategic relationship, because even in this framework there is a possibility for accomplishing the main goal—to avoid war and defend independence and state integrity. In this sense, we will not put a greater emphasis on a more real relationship. The emphasis will be put on the following:

To make Macedonia a real partner to the extent to which the interests of the two countries coincide.

To accomplish this the following is necessary: Direct recognition of the interests of Macedonia in this place and time as an interest of a state—to recognize the same value of our interests with a part of the interests of this big country that will coincide. The coincidence should be backed by concrete and good material contents to the extent to which we can make an offer: space, people, natural and created values and good social, political, state, and legal ambience and context:

To recognize the strategy of Macedonia as such and to treat it as a recognized strategy of a country, regardless of the size of the country.

The other matching strategy, no matter how much it is a strategy of a country that is too big compared to ours, must recognize Macedonia's right to defense as a normal and natural right, and the accomplishment of its interests in this space and within these frameworks.

History is rich with examples when the powerful countries imposed their interest on the weak. It is no wonder if Macedonia is in a position in which it must accept a level and quality of relations that it would not have accepted had the conditions been more favorable. When we speak of this interstrategic relationship (the United States and Macedonia), a higher level of relations can meet the interests of both sides in favor of a peaceful settlement of the critical situation in the region.

Why is it actually necessary to discuss this aspect of our mutual relationship and should we in Macedonia be satisfied?

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There are numerous reasons and they are quite different. Some of them are theoretical, but most of them are practical and even psychological. There is still a justified opinion that the peace to which we are sacrificing ourselves is the greatest achievement for us and for others, too. We are an oasis of peace and our merits for this are apparent. Macedonia is the most exhibited small country in the world at this moment.

Since our strategy has been long occupied with the "internationalization of the Macedonian question...," we now have it on the highest possible level. Macedonia is a real diplomatic Mecca. It is true that our peace is under great pressure of the war—hot and cold—from the surrounding regions. Tanks are constantly being counted out, as well as aircraft, rockets, and other military devices around us, and therefore our people feel lost in a weightlessness, and let us say confused. The people accept the peaceful policy led by Macedonia. That is why it accepted with hospitality the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations, and in this framework the U.S. contingent. This military engagement of the United States in Macedonia has led to a great development of military relations between the United States and the Republic of Macedonia.

These relations are estimated as good by both sides. They are estimated as relations on a high, even on the highest level. It can be proven with arguments. I think that there has not been a relevant position of the U.S. military system that has not shown respect to Macedonia. Our country has been visited by many high and competent personalities: The secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some heads of the various U.S. Armed Forces services, commanders of NATO forces in Europe, strong and powerful groups of the fleet, chairmen of congressional committees and offices, high personalities in the security field, and so on. It is true that they all performed spectacular inspections of military and special teams in the U.S. contingent, and therefore a dilemma arises: Are they visiting the U.S. contingent or Macedonia? Anyway, the U.S. contingent and the numerous visits have a calming effect and they really contribute to drawing war away from Macedonia, which is a fact that should be respected. That is why this review of U.S.-Macedonian military relations is not aimed at criticizing, but at revealing their real value.

There has been created and there still exists an impression about the mentioned positive assessments of our mutual military relations. They are good, but they are beyond such a level. Actually, the level of military relations between the United States and Macedonia is very low; it is below the needs and interests of Macedonia, and I think that it is also below the U.S. interests. If we accept the view of J. Baker, former U.S. secretary of state, the U.S. strategy probably has its own view about the problem and it considers that it can achieve its goals even in this way. Due to this, as well as due to some other factors, the United States has been maintaining the lowest level of military relations. This is wrong and it is very risky in Balkan conditions to assess the power of the U.S. deterrence. When interstrategic relations are at stake, it is worth mentioning our own assessments.

First, it is quite true that the U.S. interests in this region are being accomplished systematically, and I am sure very successfully and at a good price, and that is perfectly all right. On the other hand, Macedonia must be satisfied with intermediate results concerning its own security. Our interests are being accomplished at the edge of endurance, with great difficulty, even under a continuing pressure and arrangement from positions on which the United States can exert a favorable influence. A "coincidental" strategy would have to give compensation for our maximum investment and contribution.

Secondly, the mentioned assessments are simply not realistic and they cannot endure a more serious scientific criticism. Namely, the military U.S.-Macedonian relations cannot be at a higher level than the interstate relations. They cannot be "high" if the interstate relations are not such—in the sense of development.

Thirdly, if the United States defends and controls this region it can mean a direct protection for Macedonia, too, but it still does not mean the defense of Macedonia. The defense of Macedonia cannot be any by-product of any strategy or policy. It is a completely different relation and quality in the interstrategic relations.

Fourth, I think that it is apparent that these relations are unilateral and it is not easy to talk about mutual military relations, particularly about interstrategic relations; in joint relations they certainly need not be equal, but realistic. Our participation in these interstrategic relations is small and under the level of our investment, contribution, and weight. The military capacity of Macedonia and its social, geographic, and strategic position is underestimated at this moment, judging by the behavior of the big states toward a small state.

Small nations and countries are frequently underestimated as opponents. This has often been demonstrated to be a wrong strategy and policy. Such an arrogant attitude has in the past made the big military system of a superpower tremble. In our case it is not a matter of underestimating the opponent, but of the partner to the extent to which we really are a partner.

I have already mentioned that the U.S. strategy has its own views on the situation in the Balkans and in the European southeast. Recently we heard about the forecasts for a possible development of the situation in this region that were prepared by the U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies in which, among other things, it was noted: "As a part of the UN mission, the United States has 525 soldiers along the eastern part of the border between Serbia and Macedonia...; the relationships with the UN commanders are generally satisfactory, except for the fact that the United States refuses to occupy positions between the Serbian and the Macedonian forces...; the plans for evacuation seem possible

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and they are constantly being practiced." This can lead to the conclusion that not only does the U.S. strategy not exclude the possibility of withdrawing its contingent, but it also has a plan for such a case. It is nothing new for the professionals. On one occasion I mentioned that, according to our customs, we as hosts shall do our best for the security of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], and within this framework also for the U.S. contingent. However, we must realize the possibility that the U.S. strategy can temporarily be withdrawn from some territory. The Macedonian strategy cannot afford such a luxury. We can by no means abandon Macedonia. Because of these and because of a range of other mentioned and nonmentioned reasons, I pledge for actual mutual and closer relations between our policies and strategies, because it is true that our interests and goals coincide. Our strategic analyses, in spite of different approaches, are not voluntaristic, and the other side should pay respect to them in the interstrategic relations. Actually, Macedonia will be of a specific position, and therefore of a greater value if there is a wish for controlling this region. On the other hand, our reliance on the collective security and on the force of the U.S. deterrent should be realistic. Ability is necessary even if you want to rely on something. Nevertheless, it is just a subjective view of the relations in this field and I hope that it will be useful for the future development of mutual relations.

Albanian-Language University at Tetovo Opens

AU1502162095 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Tetovo Albanian University started work today, with 15 February marking a new stage in the education of Albanians in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Reports from Tetovo confirm that all Albanian political institutions and parties were present at the ceremony of this important educational and cultural act. University Rector Mr. Fadil Sulejmani delivered the keynote speech.

You will receive more information about this activity in the evening.

Lectures To Begin 16 Feb

LD1502172495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1627 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—A formal ceremony was held today to mark the beginning of lectures at the illegal Albanian-language university in the Mala Recica suburb of Tetovo, in the north west of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], a TANJUG correspondent reports.

Members of the ethnic university's administration, over 1,000 citizens of the Shqiptar [ethnic Albanian] nationality, leaders of political parties, about 100 students and foreign guests attended the ceremony that took place in a peaceful atmosphere and without police intervention. Among the guests was a delegation of the U.S.-Albanian Friendship Society led by Former Congressman Joseph Diogardi.

Although journalists were told by members of the university administration that lectures in six faculties will start tomorrow, Menduh Taci, one of the leaders of the breakaway wing of the Shqiptar Party of Democratic Prosperity, said today that the lectures "have already started."

Skopje TV today carried a rebroadcast of last night's report on the Albanian state television that attached a priority importance to the opening of the Tetovo university. The official Tirana recognizes the ethnic university of Shqiptars in the FYROM, and its opening on 17 December last year, although contravening the provisions of the Macedonian Constitution and law, was proclaimed the event of the year.

MP: Constitution Discriminates Against Albanians

AU1502180595 Skopje MIC in English 14 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "We are determined, without compromise, to make the Albanian language official in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], in all administrative organs—from local to republic level, including the communication with the army," Sali Ramadani, independent member of the Macedonian Parliament, otherwise, a "Tachist" [Mendu Thachi, leader of a Party for Democratic Prosperity faction] stated for Radio Tirana in a telephone discussion.

In the discussion filled with emotions and euphoric at moments, Ramadani announced that the Albanian MPs would regularly discuss in their "beautiful Albanian language," but sometimes, only sometimes, in direct communication with the Macedonians, as he said "we will also talk in Macedonian, in order to say the truth about the Albanian question in Macedonia and broader."

Further on, Ramadani said that there could be no advance in the status of the Albanians without a change in the existing Constitution. "The Constitution which is in effect is discriminating for us Albanians," said Ramadani.

Business Delegation Pays 2-Day Visit to Belgrade

AU1602111995 Skopje MIC in English 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yesterday, two groups of Macedonian businessmen arrived in Belgrade. One group will participate in the work of the Association of Commerce Chambers from the Balkan, as part of which the possibilities of organizing a common Balkan fair will be reviewed. The second group, led by the president of the

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Chamber of Commerce Dusan Petreski, is expected to start negotiations today with the Serbian Chamber of Commerce.

According to unofficial sources, the meeting between the Serbian and Macedonian businessmen will last two days and will be held behind closed doors. Unofficial sources also mention the possibility of a meeting being held between Dusan Petreski and the Prime Minister of Serbia Mirko Marjanovic.

It is expected that the topic of discussions with the Serbian businessmen will be the cooperation between the Macedonian and Serbian economies and the establishment of better economic relations between the former Yugoslav republics.

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Federal

Government Condemns Montenegrin Muslim Autonomy

LD1502201395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1909 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 15 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav authorities on Wednesday took the stand that the decision of leaders of the Islamic religious community in Montenegro to proclaim full autonomy was an attempt at the Albanization of the Slav population of Islamic faith and the Shiitization [as received] of the non-Slav Muslim population.

A Yugoslav Government statement said the government commission for relations with religious communities had established that the decision was contrary to the constitutionally guaranteed religious rights and freedoms of Yugoslav citizens.

The commission upheld the position of Slav Islamites in Montenegro that the decision taken by leaders of the Montenego Islamic community was an attempt at the Albanization of the Slav population of Islamic faith, and that it departed from the 70-year-old commitment of the Islamic community in Yugoslavia. The same position has been taken by the majority of official representatives of the Islamites in Yugoslavia.

The statement said that since two-thirds of the Muslims in the Yugoslav republic of Montenegro were of Slav descent and Sunnites, it was obvious that the decision of the Montenegro Islamic community could deepen the differences on which the radical Shiite wing insisted.

The government commission underscored that the decision of the Montenegro Islamic community to proclaim full autonomy and elect a reis was aimed at the Shiitization of the entire Muslim population and the achievement of the fundamentalist, separatist goals of leaders of the Islamic religious community in the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija.

A strong separatist movement of ethnic Albanians, predominantly Islamites, has been active in Kosovo and Metohija for decades. The movement's leaders have illegally proclaimed the province a 'republic' with a view to having it eventually break away from Serbia and Yugoslavia and join Albania.

The government commission said it had good relations with all religious communities, including the Islamic, except for the leaders of the Islamic community in Kosovo and Metohija. The commission said the decision of leaders of the Montenegro Islamic community directly undermined the unity of Islamites in Yugoslavia and ran counter to the practice of the Islamic communities in European states to have only one supreme leadership.

The election of reis of the Montenegro Islamic community is a gross violation of the Yugoslav constitution which is among the most democratic in the world in terms of religious rights and freedoms and which guarantees equal rights to all citizens, believers and non-believers, the commission set out.

Serbia

TU Demonstrators Demand Resignation of Ministers

AU1502133595 Paris AFP in English 1329 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 15 (AFP)—Some four hundred activists of the Independent Metal Workers Syndicate demonstrated here Wednesday [15 February], demanding resignations of the Serbian ministers of Industry and Labour, Oskar Fodor and Jovan Radic.

The demonstrators issued a proclamation asking for new Labour Law, and "creating conditions for free-market economy."

Unionists denounced their "humiliating situation," accusing the Serbian Government of "exhausting the State reserves due to preservation of the false social peace." Activists of the Independent Syndicates also accused the authorities of discrimination in favour of official, state-controled syndicates.

The economic embargo against the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), imposed in 1992, seriously affected the industry. "The government should stop play with our future and our lives," said a document presented to the Serbian government.

Montenegro

Trade Minister, UK Officials Discuss Ties

LD1502135795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1325 GMT 15 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 15 Feb (TANJUG)—Dusko Lalicevic, minister of trade in the Montenegrin Government, received David Arathoon, head of section in the Exports to Europe and the Americas Division of the British Department of Trade and Industry, and Ivor Roberts, charge d'affaires in the British Embassy in Belgrade, in Podgorica today.

It was announced that the guests and their host discussed the scope for renewing economic cooperation between Montenegro and Great Britain after the lifting of the international sanctions against our country. Slavica Milacic, assistant foreign minister of Montenegro, also received the high-ranking official of the British Department of Trade and Industry in Podgorica.

During the meeting, both sides expressed the expectation that the positive development of events in terms of resolving the Yugoslav crisis will enable the two countries to orientate their bilateral relations toward the full

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normalization of overall cooperation, bearing in mind the former position of Great Britain as our important economic and financial parter.

Kosovo

Serbs Plan Anti-Milosevic Rally in Pristina

AU1502164895 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 95 p 4

[Unattributed report: "A Rally of 40,000 Signatories Announced in Pristina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—In March, it will be five years since the promise was made that 100,000 Serbs would return to Kosovo. This has not happened, but what has happened is that, during this period, 250,000 Albanians were born. This was stated by Momcilo Trajkovic, one of the leaders of the Serbian Resistance, Movement for Kosovo-Metohija, at a news conference in Belgrade yesterday since, according to the members of the movement, such news conferences are impossible to hold in Pristina because of the media blockade.

The Serbian strategy has been defeated by the Albanian separatists' strategy, Kosovo-Metohija has become a party problem of the party in power. We take the view that the Kosovo problem is a national and state problem, and that it should be dealt with accordingly, and not be abused during elections and later forgotten, as is done by all parties, Trajkovic said.

The leaders of the Serbian Resistance Movement stressed that, to date, they have not received an answer to an open letter that they sent to all important institutions last September, nor an answer to the initiative to form a National Council through which all parties would participate in the creation of a national program.

"Since we have not received an answer from those who should have provided an answer, we are preparing a rally of 40,000 signatories of that letter in Pristina. We have not set the date yet, because, at this moment, we do not want to weaken the national and state energy that is directed toward the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina," said Trajkovic announcing future activities of the movement, which, he claims, enjoys the support of all the relevant political and national forces in Serbia. The Kosovo Serbs have repeated that they favor a peaceful and political solution and that they are ready for a dialogue with the leaders that have real influence among the Albanian population.

"We want to live in a state that will take care of the southern province responsibly. Had the Albanians wanted power, they would have taken it at the first elections. However, this is not their goal. Their goal is to take the territory," Trajkovic said.

Dusan Ristic said that, if the Albanians took power at elections, they would compromise themselves before the international public because they would then be responsible for everything that is happening in Kosovo, and that the majority of Albanians will agree to stay in Serbia if foreign powers force them to do so.

Will Kosovo Serbs Topple Milosevic?

In response to the remark that it was, in fact, the leaders of the Kosovo Serbs that brought Milosevic to power and, in that context, the question of whether the Kosovo Serbs will continue to work on strengthening the state role of the president of the Republic, or whether they will possibly try to topple him, Miroslav Solevic said:

"I am not in favor of toppling Milosevic, but I do favor a change to a better one. We did not bring him to the power. He came to power as chairman of the League of Communists. It is correct that we have helped him to strengthen his position and fight off his opponents. It is also correct that we made a mistake in our assessment that the chairman of the League of Communists could help in solving a national issue."

Answering the question as to what he would tell Slobodan Milosevic if he met him today, Kosta Bulatovic said: "I would tell him to be a nationalist, a big nationalist, but not a chauvinist, and to take care of national interests." Answering the same question, Miroslav Solevic said: "I would not tell him anything as this would be to no avail."

Serb Security Forces Torture Ethnic Albanians

AU1602112895 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 15 Feb 95 p 10

[Article by Agim Muhaxheri: "Demonization of the Albanians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The campaign involving the arrest and detention of former personnel of the Kosova Secretariat for Internal Affairs [SUP] has not only angered us but has provoked reactions from the international public. International human rights organizations such as the Helsinki Committee, Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, the International Red Cross have been informed about this "criminal case." As we know, the mass arrests began in mid-November last year, at a time when Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the president of the Republic of Kosova, was visiting various European countries and the United States, conducting talks with many governments and informing them of the serious situation prevailing in Kosova.

Investigations Against "Colleagues"

According to its scenario, the Serbian regime arrested former commandants and deputy commandants of police stations, former senior public security chiefs of the former Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosova and of the communes, and former inspectors of state and public security. The suspects were seized at home, on the street, or wherever they were found. The men arrested were

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precisely those who were committed to the Independent Trade Union of the Kosova SUP. They were charged with allegedly jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the self-proclaimed entity, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. The aim of the regime, it goes without saying, has been to demonize the Albanians.

The suspects are charged with supposedly forming the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Kosova and compiling lists of Serbian leaders and their families for liquidation. The Serbian press and other media led the campaign with sensational headlines such as "Albanian Paramilitaries Detained," with the oft-repeated word *siptar* [derogatory term for an Albanian in Serbo-Croatian.]

It is claimed that the suspects were not only "Albanian paramilitaries," but also "spies of a terrorist organization," who had "prepared diversionary terrorist acts." It is further claimed that the suspects had formed military staffs attached to "security centers." and that their duty, in the case of "the outbreak of war," was to "oppose the Serbian state authorities, the Serbian Internal Affairs Ministry, and the Yugoslav Army." The Serbian press further states that coordinators Avdi Mehmedoviqi and Jonuz Terstena were appointed to head the "Albanian Auxiliary Police."

Threatened With Liquidation

While the suspects were being interrogated, Serbian state security tortured their Albanian "colleagues" in the cruelest fashion. They were humiliated and threatened with death if they refused to incriminate themselves. Immediately after this outrage, Miodrag Brklac, the puppet prosecutor in Prishtina, held a news conference at which, attempting to hoodwink the international public, he said that "no physical torture has been used" against the former personnel of the Kosova SUP.

According to him, everything had been conducted according to the (Serbian) law of penal procedure. The Prishtina investigating judge Danica Marinkovic announced the same to lawyers. This judge, in contravention of legal ethics, even failed to contain herself following an "incident" with Destan Rukiqi, one of the defense lawyers, telling him, "You talk to me about torture, while they (the Albanian suspects) wanted to bring down the state...." Albanian lawyers have denied the prosecutor's allegations at three news conferences and have told of the brutal tortures to which their clients have been subjected. As they put it, their bodies have been beaten black and blue. Their only "sin," they add, has been to inform the Independent Trade Unions of Kosova and the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms about the violence that the Serbian regime has been using against the Albanian people and also the former personnel of the Kosova SUP.

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